THE  POLITICAL  HISTORY  OF  ALBANIA 
1907  ■ 1920 

BY 

RAYMOND  JAMES  SONTAG 
B.  S.  University  of  Illinois,  1920 


THESIS 

Submitted  in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the  Requirements  for  the 

Degree  of 

> , 

MASTER  OF  ARTS 
IN  HISTORY 

IN 

THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 
OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


1921 


CONTENTS 


Page 


INTRODUCTION 

1 

CHAPTER 

I 

THE 

SITUATION  IN  1907 

3 

CHAPTER 

II 

THE 

INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  IN  1907 

13 

CHAPTER 

III 

THE 

WINNING  OF  AUTONOMY 

21 

CHAPTER 

IV 

THE 

TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  AND  ALBANIAN  INDEPENDENCE 

32 

CHAPTER 

V 

THE 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  STATE 

39 

CHAPTER 

VI 

THE 

GOVERNMENT  OF  WILLIAM  OF  WIED 

47 

CHAPTER 

VII 

ITALY  AND  ALBANIA 

56 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

— 

i 

INTRODUCTION 


Something  less  than  a half  century  ago  the  ablest  states- 
man of  Europe,  Bismarck,  blandly  informed  Albanian  delegates  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin  that  "there  is  no  Albanian  nationality."1  Within 
a year  the  Albanians  had  upset  the  treaty  carefully  prepared  under 
the  guidance  of  this  statesman.  In  1908  Abdul  Hamid  acquiesced  in 
the  demands  of  the  Young  Turks  only  when  the  Albanians,  up  to  this 
time  his  most  faithful  supporters,  joined  in  the  popular  demand  for 
a "constitution,"  a term,  as  we  shall  see  later,  then  connoting  to 
the  Albanian  approximately  what  we  popularly  connect  with  the  word 
"paradise."  And  finally,  after  a bewildering  kaleidoscopic  succes- 
sion of  events,  we  find  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  in 
December  of  1920  admitting  Albania  to  membership  in  the  League  as 
a free  and  sovereign  state. 

It  will  be  the  somewhat  ambitious  purpose  of  this  study 
to  trace  the  interaction  of  the  forces  at  work  in  Albania  during  the 
years  from  1907  to  1920  in  such  a manner  that  the  events  of  this 
period  — in  themselves  discontinuous  and  chaotic  — may  serve  as 
an  historical  explanation  of  the  present  status  of  Albania. 

What  might  be  called  the  external  or  international  forces 
active  during  this  time  arise  out  of  the  rival  interests  and  ambi- 
tions of  neighboring  powers  — the  strategic  importance  of  the 
country  for  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary;  the  economic  needs  of  Serbia; 
the  historical  and  ethnographical  claims  of  Greece.  Within  the 

^Chekrezi,  C. A. ; Albania. Past  and  Present.  N.Y.(1920).  p.  xv. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https://archive.org/details/politicalhistoryOOsont 


2 


country  the  character  of  the  people  themselves  will  demand  the  chief 
attention,  for,  as  Brailsford  aptly  points  out,  one  scarcely  knows 
whether  to  compare  the  Albanian  to  "the  knight  errant  of  the  Middle 
Ages  or  to  the  head-hunters  of  the  Malay  Peninsula."1  This  peculiar 
Albanian  mentality,  of  course,  can  be  understood  only  when  studied 
in  connection  with  its  history  and  environment.  Finally, the  way  in 
which  the  external  and  internal  forces  react  on  each  other  will  con- 
stitute the  most  interesting  and  difficult  part  of  the  whole  problem. 

It  is  not  necessary,  I take  it,  to  state  that  our  sources 
for  so  recent  a period  must  at  best  be  incomplete.  For  the  years 
after  1914  especially  the  significance  of  events  can  become  abso- 
lutely clear  only  when  archives  now  closed  to  the  historian  are 
accessible.  Here  the  writer  has  been  forced  to  rely  almost  entirely 
on  material  which  has  appeared  in  newspapers  and  periodicals,  supple- 
menting and  verifying  these,  wherever  possible,  by  such  documents  as 
have  appeared. 

To  the  writer's  knowledge,  there  is  no  work  on  Albania 
covering  the  whole  period  from  ISO?  to  the  present,  and  practically 
all  the  works  covering  any  part  of  the  field  are  distinctly  of  a 
propagandist  nature.  These  have  been  used  sparingly  and  only  after 
applying  rigid  tests  to  the  material  given.  The  importance  of  the 
subject  itself  scarcely  needs  to  be  pointed  out.  The  international 
rivalries  which  center  in  Albania  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  make 
some  knowledge  of  the  country  desirable  for  those  who  wish  to  judge 
international  events  by  reason  rather  than  by  instinct.  It  must  fur- 
ther be  remembered  that  the  boundaries  of  Albania  have  not  yet  been 
determined  and  promise  to  furnish  a very  fruitful  source  of  discord. 

■^•Brailsford, H, N.  ; Macedonia,  its  Races  and  their  Future,  p.336. 


■ 


CHAPTER  I 


1 


THE  SITUATION  IN  1907 


In  1907  there  was  scant  evidence  of  patriotic  or 
nationalist  feeling  in  Albania.  A civilization  which  had  been 
practically  stationary  for  four  centuries,  and  a people  divided  into 
two  fairly  distinct  groups  by  geography,  civilization,  and  language 
seemed  at  best  but  very  unpromising  material  for  the  making  of  a 
modern  state.  Although  the  actual  creation  of  this  state  was  due 
largely  to  the  necessities  of  European  politics,  some  knowledge  of 
previous  Albanian  history  and  of  the  people  themselves  is  essential 
to  a real  understanding  of  the  period. 

At  the  opening  of  the  Christian  era  the  Albanians,  or 
rather  their  ancestors  the  Illyrians  and  Epirots, ^occupied  most  of 
the  northern  Balkan  Peninsula,  but  by  1907  successive  invasions  had 
confined  them  chiefly  to  the  Turkish  vilayets  of  Scutari  and  Janina, 
with  large  numbers  in  the  neighboring  vilayets  of  Kossovo  and 
Monastir.2  In  the  area  within  the  boundaries  of  1913  there  were 
about  one  million  people,  practically  all  of  Albanian  stock. 


An  excellent  discussion  of  Albanian  ethnography  may  be  found  in 
Gibert,  Frederick;  Les  Pays  d* Albanie  et  Leur  Histoire , Paris (1914) . 
pp.  167-194;  the  results  of  the  voluminous  but  far  from  conclusive 
studies  of  German  students  in  this  field  are  admirably  summarized. 

p 

For  an  account  of  the  Albanian  colonies  in  Greece,  Italy,  and 
Sicily  see  Eliot,  Sir  Charles;  Turkey  in  Europe , el.  2,  London 
(1908).  pp.  351-55.  These  isolated  groups  are  interesting  because 
of  the  tenacity  with  which  they  have  maintained  their  language  and 
traditions. 

3In  Dominian,  Leon;  Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationality  in 
Europe.  N.Y.,  a total  of  one  and  one-half  million  is  quoted,  in- 


4 


The  Shkumbi  River,  in  ancient  times  the  boundary  between 
Illyrians  and  Epirote,  divides  the  Ghegs  of  the  north  from  the  Tosks 
of  the  south.  The  Ghegs  have  preserved  in  their  mountain  homes  the 
primitive  vices  and  virtues  of  the  old  Albanian  stock.  They  are 
usually  much  taller  and  of  greater  physical  strength  and  grace  than 
their  southern  countrymen.  At  home  they  are  chiefly  shepherds,  but 
the  large  number  who,  under  the  old  regime  in  Turkey,  sought  occupa- 
tions in  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  frequently  secured  very 
responsible  posts  because  of  their  native  intelligence  and  loyalty.1 
The  Tosks  are  of  a milder  temperament  a3  a result  of  contact  with 
the  more  mature  Greek  civilization.  The  comparatively  level  and 
fertile  land  of  the  south  has  also  been  a civilizing  force.  The 
strong  Greek  influence,  which  is  further  manifested  by  the  fact  that 
Greek  is  the  language  of  business  in  southern  Albania,  has  given  a 
basis  for  the  Greek  claim  to  much  of  this  region. 

The  character  of  both  Ghegs  and  Tosks  has  been  distorted 
by  foe  and  friend  alike.  Some  striking  examples  of  Balkan  neighbor- 
liness may  be  found  in  the  work  of  Dr.  Georgevitch,  former  president 
of  the  Serbian  council  of  ministers.  Here  credence  is  given  to  the 
report  that  the  Albanians  had  tails  as  late  as  the  ninth  century,  to 
stories  of  wounded  Albanians  shooting  the  Serb  doctors  who  bend  over 
to  give  aid,  and  of  women  drinking  the  blood  of  enemies  killed  in 


eluding  250,000  Serbs,  150,000  Greeks,  and  50,000  Bulgars.  All  of 
these  figures  are  probably  exaggerated,  especially  that  for  the 
Serbs,  since  the  compiler  of  the  table,  M.  Petrovich,  is  himself  a 
Serb.  For  the  large  colonies  of  Vlachs  centering  around  Korcha  and 
Berat  see  Wace,  A.J.B.,  and  Thompson,  M.S.;  The  Nomads  of  the 
Balkans . London  (1914) . pp.  213-14. 
fcliot,  Sir  Charles;  op.cit.  p.  352. 

( 19f§r^?T1^cll?  ^ • > ^es  Albanais  et  le s grande s Puissances , Paris 


' 


5 


the  vendetta,  and  finally  to  the  statement  that  "les  tribus  de 
l'Albanie  du  Nord  se  souvient  encore  de  leur  origine  slave.”  Many 
similar  writings  of  the  same  tenor  by  Greeks  or  Serbs  might  be  cited, 
the  aim  of  each  of  which  is  to  prove  the  Albanian  at  least  a first 
cousin  to  his  Satanic  majesty,  and  yet  a near  relative  to  themselves. 

Collectively  the  Albanians  enjoy  a very  unsavory  reputa- 
tion even  with  many  disinterested  observers.  Under  Abdul  Hamid  they 
were  the  scapegoats  in  practically  every  atrocity  committed  in 
Turkey.  On  the  other  hand,  since  most  of  the  Albanians  are 
Mohammedans,  and  since,  to  the  European  traveller,  every  Mohammedan 
is  a Turk,  the  Turk  has  got  all  the  credit  for  the  virtues  of  the 
individual  Albanians  who  may  be  found  scattered  through  the  Empire 
in  offices  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest.  For,  whatever  he  may  be 
at  home,  once  the  Albanian  gets  away  from  the  restriction  of  his 
native  mountains,  he  shows  an  executive  ability  coupled  with  an 
integrity  which  can  be  found  in  no  other  Balkan  people. 1 

The  chief  characteristic  of  the  Albanian  is  an  almost 
ridiculous  sense  of  honor.  He  has  an  inflexible  code  of  ethics 
which  permits  him  to  rob  violently  and  at  will,  but  prohibits 
stealing;  which  makes  the  shooting  from  ambush  of  an  enemy  an 
honorable  act, but  punishes  flirting  by  death.2  As  a result  of  this 


^Brailsford  had  occasion  to  employ  a large  number  of  Albanians, 
several  of  whom  were  former  members  of  brigand  bands,  in  connection 
with  the  distribution  of  funds  for  relief  purposes  in  Macedonia 
during  the  years  1903-04.  The  favorable  results  of  his  experiences 
with  these  men  and  with  representatives  of  other  Balkan  peoples  are 
given  in  Macedonia. Its  Races  and  their  Future . pp.  231-28. 

2Much  might  be  said  of  the  interesting  Albanian  customs  regarding 
hospitality,  marriage,  mourning,  etc.,  and  about  the  position  of 
women  in  this  essentially  masculine  country.  A vivid  and  complete 
picture  of  Albanian  life  and  habit  is  given  in  Peacock,  Wadham; 
Albania. the  Foundling  State  of  Europe . N.Y. (1914) . 


6 


primitive  code  of  honor  the  Albanian  is  continually  involved  in  the 
blood  feud  or  vendetta.  A single  murder  will  often  embroil  a whole 
tribe  in  a long  and  bloody  strife.  Gibert  gives  an  example  of  a 
feud  which  began  in  the  diccese  of  Poulati  in  1854,  "a  propos  de 
quatre  cartouches,”  lasted  two  years,  and  caused  132  deaths  and  the 
burning  of  1,218  houses.1  The  prevalence  of  this  licensed  private 
warfare  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  the  number  of  violent 
deaths  in  northern  Albania  varies  in  the  different  districts  from  25 
to  50  per  cent,  of  the  population.  As  Gibert  remarks,  the  fact  that 
vengeance  is  usually  taken  by  a surprise  attack  from  the  rear 
deprives  the  vendetta  of  any  chivalrous  character  it  might  otherwise 
possess . ^ 

The  bleak  forbidding  nature  of  most  of  Albania,  together 
with  centuries  of  foreign  domination,  have  combined  to  keep  the 
Albanians  one  of  the  most  primitive  peoples  in  Europe.  There  is 
practically  no  native  literature.  Even  the  folk  songs  are  but 
rarely  indigenous,  the  great  majority  being  Slavic  or  oriental 
importations.  The  language  itself  has  been  so  corrupted  by  the 
introduction  of  Turkish,  Slavonic,  Greek,  and  Latin  words  that  little 
remains  which  is  indubitably  Albanian.^  Until  the  present  genera- 
tion there  was  not  even  a generally  accepted  alphabet.  The  Latin 
alphabet  with  modifications  was  officially  adopted  by  congresses 


^Gibert;  op.cit.  p.  23. 

|lbid.  p.  20. 

°The  absence  of  literary  monuments  has  prevented  any  close 
historical  criticism  of  the  language.  The  results  of  the  researches 
made  by  the  numerous  German  scholars  who  have  studied  the  language 
are  given  in  Dako,  C.  A.;  Albania. the  Master  Key  to  the  Near  East , 
Boston  (1919) . pp.  8-14. 


, 


7 


held  at  Monastir  in  1908  and  at  Elbasan  in  1909.  The  Turks, 
wishing  to  prevent  the  publication  of  Albanian  literature  in  Europe, 
fought  for  the  adoption  of  the  Arabic  alphabet,  ostensibly  on 
religious  grounds.  The  Albanian  is  far  from  being  a religious 
fanatic,  however,  so  this  opposition  was  largely  unsuccessful.  The 
fact  that  the  language  was  until  recently  almost  entirely  unwritten 
is  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  divergent  dialects  of  the  Ghegs 
and  Tosks.  So  different  are  these  that  the  inhabitants  of  one 
section  can  understand  those  of  the  other  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty . 

During  the  last  half  century  numerous  spasmodic  attempts 
have  been  made  by  patriotic  Albanians  to  unify  the  language  by  the 
establishment  of  native  schools.  These  efforts  were  violently  and 
promptly  suppressed  by  the  Ottoman  government,  ably  assisted  by  the 
semi-political  Greek  Church,  both  of  which  feared  any  move  likely  to 
strengthen  Albanian  national  feeling.  In  1907  but  one  institution, 
a small  school  for  girls  at  Korcha,  had  survived  the  spiritual  and 
temporal  thunders.  Practically  all  the  other  educational  institu- 
tions in  Albania  were  supported  by  Greece,  Italy,  and  Austria- 
Hungary  as  centers  for  propaganda.  The  few  primary  and  secondary 
schools  maintained  by  the  Turkish  government  were  of  ridiculously 
low  grade,  the  Koran  being  the  center  of  the  whole  course  of  study. 
Most  of  the  wealthy  Moslem  children  were  educated  in  foreign 
countries. 

The  lack  of  education  in  Albania  is  only  equalled  by  the 
absence  of  real  religious  feeling.  Both  Islam  and  Christianity 
came  to  the  Albanians  as  foreign  religions  and  neither  has  succeeded 
in  securing  any  great  hold  on  the  people.  A large  part  of  the 


■« 

. 


8 

country  became  Moslem  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  as 
a matter  of  expediency,  but  there  remain  large  groups  of  Catholics 
in  the  north  and  of  members  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  in  the 
south.1  There  is  very  little  friction  between  the  various  faiths; 
at  least  two  are  usually  represented  in  every  tribe  except  the 
Mirdite,  which  is  entirely  Catholic.  Mohammedans  will  swear  by  the 
Virgin  or  light  a candle  in  a Christian  church  to  bring  good  luck, 
and  "the  same  boy  is  both  baptised  and  circumcised,  and  will  take 
his  chance  on  entering  either  paradise  as  Ali  or  George."2  The 
Mohammedans  of  the  north  are  largely  Sunnites,  that  is,  followers  of 
the  first  three  caliphs.  In  the  south  practically  all  of  the 
Moslems  who  take  any  deep  interest  in  religion  are  members  of  the 
heretical  Bektashi  sect,  which  was  introduced  into  the  country  by 
the  janissaries.  The  priests  of  this  faith  are  called  dervishes. 
They  preach  an  idealistic  pantheism  which  is  very  beautiful  in 
theory,  but  which,  in  practice,  often  leads  its  devotees  to  the 
excessive  use  of  opium  and  alcohol  in  their  effort  to  arrive  at  a 
state  of  religious  ecstasy.  Although  there  is  no  open  breach 
between  this  sect  and  orthodox  Mohammedanism,  the  Bektashi  are 
accounted  heretical. 

The  relative  states  of  civilization  in  northern  and 
southern  Albania  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  in  the  former  the 
primitive  tribal  system  still  holds  sway,  while  a modified  form  of 
feudalism  has  been  evolved  in  the  south.  The  peculiar  geographical 

^The  use  which  foreign  governments  make  of  the  Christian  churches 
as  instruments  of  propaganda  will  be  brought  out  later.  See  p.  19. 

JBrailsf ord,  H.  N. ; Albanians. Turks . and  Russians,  Contemporary 
Review,  vol.  100,  p.  322. 


. 


' 


8 


country  became  Moslem  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  as 
a matter  of  expediency,  but  there  remain  large  groups  of  Catholics 
in  the  north  and  of  members  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church  in  the 
south.  ^ There  is  very  little  friction  between  the  various  faiths; 
at  least  two  are  usually  represented  in  every  tribe  except  the 
Mirdite,  which  is  entirely  Catholic.  Mohammedans  will  swear  by  the 
Virgin  or  light  a candle  in  a Christian  church  to  bring  good  luck, 
and  "the  same  boy  is  both  baptised  and  circumcised,  and  will  take 
his  chance  on  entering  either  paradise  as  Ali  or  George. "2  The 
Mohammedans  of  the  north  are  largely  Sunnites,  that  is,  followers  of 
the  first  three  caliphs.  The  south  practically  all  of  the  Moslems 
who  take  any  deep  interest  in  religion  are  members  of  the  heretical 
Bektashi  sect,  which  was  introduced  into  the  country  by  the 
janissaries.  The  priests  of  this  faith  are  called  dervishes.  They 
preach  an  idealistic  pantheism  which  is  very  beautiful  in  theory, 
but  which,  in  practice,  often  leads  its  devotees  to  the  excessive 
use  of  opium  and  alcohol  in  their  effort  to  arrive  at  a state  of 
religious  ecstasy.  Although  there  is  no  open  breach  between  this 
sect  and  orthodox  Mohammedanism,  the  Bektashi  are  accounted 
heretical . 

The  relative  states  of  civilization  in  northern  and 
southern  Albania  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  in  the  former  the 
primitive  tribal  system  still  holds  sway,  while  a modified  form  of 
feudalism  has  been  evolved  in  the  south.  The  peculiar  geographical 


■^The  use  which  foreign  governments  make  of  the  Christian  churches 
as  instruments  of  propaganda  will  be  brought  out  later.  See  p. 

2Brailsford,  H.  N.:  Albanians , Turks , and  Russians.  Contemporary 
Review,  vol.  C,  p.  323. 


. 


9 


conditions  of  northern  Albania  have  been  largely  instrumental  in 
preventing  the  development  of  political  unity,  since  each  tribe  is 
practically  isolated  from  its  neighbors  by  mountain  barriers.  The 
authority  of  the  Turkish  government  was  very  slight  in  this 
inaccessible  region.  A tribal  council  conferred  with  the  Vail  at 
Scutari  concerning  levies  of  troops  and  money,  but  there  were  prac- 
tically no  local  representatives  of  the  Porte.  The  only  recognized 
legal  system  in  northern  Albania  is  the  unwritten  code  of  Leka 
Dukajini,  who  is  supposed  to  have  lived  in  the  thirteenth  or  four- 
teenth century.  The  tribal  government  is  usually  in  the  hands  of 
the  chief  and  an  hereditary  council  of  elders  who  jointly  perform 
all  the  ordinary  functions  of  government,  including  the  administra- 
tion of  justice.  Even  so  great  a lover  of  all  things  Albanian  as 
Miss  Durham  admits  that  the  tribal  laws  are  "of  a most  barbarous 
description,"  and  that  the  punishments  inflicted  under  them  are 
terrible  in  their  severity. ^ The  administration  of  southern 
Albania  was  under  the  old  regime  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  great 
land-owning  Beys.  The  government  made  some  pretense  of  really 
ruling  here,  especially  in  and  near  the  larger  towns,  but  since  the 
government  officials  were  in  many  cases  the  younger  sons  of  the  rich 
native  families,  there  was  in  reality  little  outside  interference.10 

The  brief  summary  of  Albanian  history  to  1907  necessary  to 
make  clear  the  situation  at  that  date  will  serve  to  bring  out  two 
important  points.  In  the  first  place,  through  all  this  record  of 


^Durham,  M.  E. ; Constitution  of  North  Albania.  Contemporary  Review. 
Vol . 94,  p.  534. 

2Gaulis,  Georges;  La  Ruine  d'un  Empire , Paris  (1913) . pp.  3S0-356. 


’ 


10 


invasions  and  conquests  by  foreign  powers,  periods  of  native  rule 
have  been  few  and  brief.  This  furnishes  a strong  basis  for  the  fear 
that  the  Albanians  do  not  possess  the  qualities  essential  for  the 
maintenance  of  a self-governing  state.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
observer  cannot  help  being  struck  by  the  way  in  which  the  ethnic 
unity  of  the  Albanian  stock  has  withstood  long  centuries  of  intimate 
contact  with  alien  peoples. 

From  the  first  to  the  fourth  centuries  Albania  formed  part 
of  the  Roman  province  of  Dalmatia  and  came  under  the  influence  of 
Latin  culture.  In  the  third  century  the  great  invasions  of  the 
Balkan  peninsula  began,  and  in  the  succeeding  two  centuries  Albania 
was  overrun  by  the  Goths,  the  native  inhabitants  taking  refuge  in 
the  mountains.  For  a short  time  in  the  sixth  century  the  oountry 
again  came  under  the  rule  of  the  Eastern  Empire,  but  the  end  of  the 
seventh  century  saw  practically  the  whole  territory  in  the  hands  of 
the  Serbo-Croats,  there  to  remain  almost  continuously  for  seven 
hundred  years.  To  this  day  most  of  the  place  names  in  northern 
Albania  are  of  Slavonic  origin. 

During  this  period  portions  of  Albania  were  at  one  time  or 
another  under  Bulgarian,  Byzantine,  and  even  Norman  rule,  but  the 
Serbian  power  was  not  finally  broken  until  the  death  of  the  great 
Stephen  Dushan  (1356) . After  that  came  a period  of  rule  by  chief- 
tains of  more  or  less  local  origin.  The  climax  of  this  epoch  of 
native  rule  and  the  most  glorious  period  of  Albanian  history  was  the 
defense  of  the  country  by  George  Kastriota  (Scanderbeg)  who  fought 
thirteen  successful  campaigns  against  the  Turks  between  the  year 
1444  and  his  death  in  1466.  In  1499,  however,  the  Turks  took 
Durazzo  and  thus  completed  the  conquest  of  the  country.  Under  the 


. 


■ 


. 


■ 


11 


rule  of  Turkey  Albanian  civilization  practically  came  to  a stand- 
still. There  is  nothing  for  the  historian  to  note  during  the 
succeeding  three  centuries  except  a great  movement  of  Albanians  into 
Old  Serbia  in  the  seventeenth  century,  following  the  migration  of 
the  Serbian  inhabitants  into  Hungary. 

In  the  later  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries 
there  was  a recrudescence  of  native  rule,  practically  independent 
dynasties  being  established  at  Scutari  and  Janina.  Both  of  these 
were  overthrown  by  the  Turks,  but  when  an  attempt  was  made  to 
strengthen  Turkish  sovereignty  in  Albania  about  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century  a series  of  revolts  broke  out  which  soon  became 
chronic. 

At  the  Congress  of  Berlin  parts  of  Albanian  territory  were 
handed  around  to  her  Balkan  neighbors  with  scant  regard  for  ethno- 
graphical boundaries.  As  a protest  an  Albanian  League  was  formed, 
probably  with  the  assistance  of  the  Porte,  ansi  was  so  far  successful 
as  to  force  Montenegro  to  substitute  as  her  share  of  the  spoils, 
Dulcigno  for  the  districts  of  Gusinje  and  Plava,  and  to  compel  the 
cancellation  of  the  clauses  granting  territory  in  southern  Albania 
to  Greece. 

Since  the  usefulness  of  the  league  to  the  Sultan  was  now 
ended,  and  since  its  members  presently  began  to  agitate  in  favor  of 
autonomy  for  Albania,  an  army  was  sent  into  the  country.  After  a 
struggle  the  league  forces  were  dispersed  and  its  leaders  deported. 
How  far  this  movement  represented  a genuine  nationalist  protest  it 
is  difficult  to  say,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  prospect  of  real 
government  under  the  Montenegrins  with  all  the  inevitable  restric- 
tions on  time-honored  Albanian  license  was  a very  real  incentive 


. 


13 


to  action. 

Within  a few  years  Abdul  Hamid  discovered  in  these  same 
bellicose  Albanians  the  strongest  defense  of  his  despotism.  The 
Albanian  had  nothing  to  hope  for  in  the  breakup  of  the  Empire.  He 
already  had  everything  which  he  really  valued  — anarchy  at  home 
and  the  privilege  of  plundering  his  neighbors  at  will.  In  return, 
he  was  only  too  willing  to  hold  the  nationalist  movements  of  western 
Macedonia  in  check  by  a constant  guerilla  warfare  against  Serb, 
Bulgar,  and  Greek  alike.  Of  more  subtle,  but  no  less  valuable  ser- 
vice to  the  Porte  was  the  threat  of  Albanian  revolt  which  greeted 
every  Macedonian  reform  project  of  the  Powers. 

By  190?  the  situation  was  anything  but  reassuring.  To  the 
north,  the  Montenegrin  frontier  was  still  unsettled  in  several 
places,  with  the  result  that  the  disputed  territory  served  as  a 
perennial  battleground.  In  Old  Serbia  the  remaining  Slavs  were 
slowly  but  surely  being  exterminated  by  the  Albanian  immigrants, 
while  Serbia  looked  on  in  helpless  rage.  The  marauding  tactics  of 
the  Albanians  in  Macedonia  had  earned  for  them  the  hatred  of  all 
the  races  of  that  region.  The  struggle  of  Tosk  and  Greek  for 
dominance  in  southern  Albania  was  going  on  very  unostentatiously 
but  none  the  less  bitterly.  The  chief  weapon  there  was  the  Albanian 
spelling-book,  an  object  of  deadly  hatred  to  Greek  and  Turk  alike. x 


"^Woods,  H.  C.  ; The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe , London  (1811)  . pp.  87-130. 


* 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  SITUATION  IN  1907 

Of  late  years  much  has  been  heard  about  a very  elusive 
body  of  principles  called  the  "Rights  of  Small  Nations."  In  prac- 
tice these  "rights"  have  usually  been  just  about  what  the  Great 
Powers  chose  to  make  them.  In  the  case  of  Albania  they  have  been 
exactly  what  the  Powers  were  forced  to  make  them. 

The  geography  of  the  Adriatic  littoral  has  been  the 
dominating  element  in  the  international  aspect  of  the  Albanian 
situation.  In  1907  the  heel  of  Italy  was  the  most  vulnerable  part 
of  the  peninsula,  for  on  the  east  coast  of  that  heel  there  was  not 
a single  harbor  worthy  of  the  name.  And  directly  across  the 
Adriatic,  less  than  fifty  miles  from  Otranto,  was  Valona,  a squalid, 
dirty  Albanian  town  with  a harbor  which  with  a little  development 
and  fortification  could  be  made  to  dominate  the  entrance  to  the 
Adriatic.  Obviously  Italy  could  not  tolerate  the  occupation  of  this 
key  position  by  a rival  power.  The  situation  was  equally  delicate 
for  Italy's  ally  and  traditional  enemy,  Austria-Hungary.  Valona  in 
the  hands  of  a hostile  nation  would  mean  a land-locked  Austrian 
Empire.  The  extremists  in  both  countries  hoped  for  even  more  than 
this  merely  negative  security.  If  the  Adriatic  were  ever  to  become 
an  Italian  lake,  as  the  more  violent  of  the  Irredentists  hoped, 
Albania  must  become  part  of  Italy;  while  Austria  had  great  hopes  of 
bringing  Albania  under  Habsburg  control  by  means  of  the  projected 
Novibazar  railway. 


14 

For  Serbia  also  the  geographical  problem  was  of  primary 
importance.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  country  along  the  Drin  is 
very  rough,  the  natural  outlet  for  Serbian  commerce  is  through 
northern  Albania.  The  Montenegrin  mountains  are  impassible  in  win- 
ter and  the  building  of  a railway  through  them  would  present  almost 
insoluble  problems.  With  the  undeveloped  Albanian  ports  in  the  hands 
of  Turkey,  therefore,  and  with  the  Montenegrin  coast  inaccessible, 
Serbia  was  forced  to  send  most  of  her  exports  through  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  ignominy  of  this  situation  was  brought  home  to  the 
Serbians  at  frequent  intervals  by  Austrian  embargoes  on  the  importa- 
tion of  swine,  the  largest  export  of  Serbia.  Whether  or  not  the 
embargoes  really  were  set  up  in  order  to  prevent  the  spread  of  hog 
cholera  the  Serbian  farmer  neither  knew  nor  cared.  But  he  was  pain- 
fully aware  of  the  fact  that  the  prosperity  of  his  country  was 
dependent  on  the  good  will  of  a foreign  power.  Serbia  was  at  best 
a second-rate  power,  however,  and  economic  necessity  is  rarely 
considered  a sufficient  justification  for  the  land-hunger  of  small 
states.  For  this  reason  the  Serbs  to  a large  extent  rested  their 
claim  on  historic  grounds. 

The  rivalry  of  Italy  and  Austria  in  the  Adriatic  began 
immediately  after  the  unification  of  Italy.  For  a time  Austria  more 
than  maintained  her  position.  By  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  she  was  con- 
firmed in  the  possession  of  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar,  a strip  of 
enormous  strategic  value  and  as  a result  insured  the  separation  of 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  and  opened  a channel  for  the  passage  of 
Austrian  propaganda  into  Albania  and  Macedonia.  The  situation 
changed,  however,  with  the  creation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Austria 
hoped  to  gain  two  negative  but  important  things  from  this  alliance: 


. 


15 


freedom  from  the  danger  of  hostile  Italian  intervention  in  case  of 
an  Austro-Russian  war,  and  the  cessation  of  the  Irredentist  propa- 
ganda in  Italy.  To  what  extent  Austrian  expectations  were  justified 
it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  determine.  The  important 
point  to  be  noted  here  is  that  Italy  demanded  greater  and  greater 
concessions  in  return,  practically  all  of  which  were  granted  under 
pressure  from  Berlin.1 *  The  original  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
(1882)  made  no  direct  mention  of  Balkan  affairs.  Five  years  later 
Italy,  Great  Britain,  and  Austria-Hungary,  undertook  by  an  exchange 
of  notes  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  without,  however, 
as  Lord  Salisbury  was  very  careful  to  make  plain,  "determining 
beforehand  the  character  which  the  cooperation  . . . ought  in  any 
particular  contingency  to  take."3  While  Austrian  participation  in 
this  agreement  was  still  being  discussed  the  Triple  Alliance  was 
renewed.  This  time  Italy  succeeded  in  securing  a separate  treaty 
with  Austria  providing  for  the  occupation  of  Balkan  territory  only 
on  the  basis  of  an  agreement  between  the  two  powers.3  It  is  not  at 


1Until  very  recently  it  was  impossible  to  trace  accurately  the 
course  of  Austr o-Italian  rivalry  in  Albania.  Much  of  the  obscurity 
has  been  cleared  away,  however,  by  the  publication  of  the  series  of 
treaties  centering  around  the  Triple  Alliance  (Pribram,  A.F.;  ed. , 
The  Secret  Treaties  of  Austria-Hungary  1879-1914.  English  edition 
by  A.C.Coolidge,  Cambridge,  1920 . ) While  this  collection  contains 
only  documents  found  in  the  Austrian  archives,  the  Adriatic  question 
was  of  such  vital  importance  to  the  Habsburg  monarchy  that  there  is 
but  slight  possibility  of  the  existence  of  further  important 
material.  Some  of  the  treaties  in  this  work  have  been  published 
elsewhere,  but  for  convenience  in  reference  it  has  seemed  best  to 
use  but  the  one  source  wherever  possible. 


glbid.  p.103.  N 

"...  cette  occupation  n'aura  lieu  qu'apres  un  accord  prealable 
entre  les  deux  susdites  puissances,  base  sur  le  principe  d'une 
compensation  reciproque  pour  tout  avantage  territorial  ou  autre  que 
chacune  d'elles  obtiendrait  en  sus  du  statu  quo  actuel,  et  donnant 
faction  aux  interets  et  aux  pretentions  bien  fondles  des  deux 


nart lea 


Ibid,  n. 108 


. 


16 


all  improbable  that  Austrian  statesmen  were  influenced  in  agreeing 
to  this  convention  by  the  thought  of  the  already  consummated  British- 
Italian  rapprochement . Similarly,  when  the  third  treaty  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  made  in  1891  Austria  was  at  a disadvantage 
because  of  the  increasingly  manifest  friendship  between  France  and 
Russia.  Italy,  therefore,  was  in  an  excellent  position  to  secure 
further  concessions.  This  time  the  Austro-Italian  Balkan  agreement 
was  incorporated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  main  treaty,  which  was 
now  put  in  the  general  form  which  it  retained  until  1914.^ 

The  first  direct  reference  to  Albania  in  the  correspon- 
dence between  Italy  and  Austria  was  made  in  1900  in  connection  with 
an  interpellation  in  the  Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  Signor  Venosta,  answered  the  question  by  stating 
that  Austria  and  Italy  were  working  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  in  Albania.  He  communicated  this  reply  to  Vienna,  and 
sought  confirmation  not  only  of  this  statement  of  policy  but  also 
of  the  oral  agreement  reached  with  the  Austrian  Foreign  Minister  in 
1897  by  which  the  two  powers  agreed  to  use  their  efforts,  "au  cas  ou 
l'Stat  de  chose s actuel  ne  pourrait  “etre  conserve,  et  ou  des 
changements  s ' imposeraient,  afin  que  les  modifications  y relatives 
se  r€alisent  dans  le  sens  de  1' autonomie . w This  position,  accepted 
by  Austria,  was  maintained  through  all  the  subsequent  Balkan  dif- 
ficulties. 

By  these  successive  steps  Italy  had  succeeded  in  putting 
herself  on  an  equal  basis  with  Austria  in  the  settlement  of  Albanian 


ilbid.  pp. 150-163. 
*Ibid.  pp. 196-201. 


i ■ i - ' ! -c-,  v >.-r  n **j  i s ■ ■ \i 


17 


affairs.  Further  than  this  neither  could  allow  the  other  to  go, 
and  a stalemate  resulted  which  obtained  official  recognition  in 
Italy  in  a speech  made  before  the  Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies  in 
1905  by  Foreign  Minister  Tittoni: 


"Albania  has  no  great  importance  in  itself,  but 
its  littoral  and  its  ports  are  all-important,  as 
they  would  assure  to  Austria  or  Italy,  if  either 
of  the  two  powers  possessed  them,  the  uncontested 
military  supremacy  in  the  Adriatic.  Now,  neither 
can  Italy  allow  Austria  such  supremacy,  nor  could 
Austria  to  Italy,  and  if  ever  one  of  them  should 
claim  it,  the  other  would  have  to  use  every  means 
to  oppose  it.  This  is  the  logic  of  the  situation. 

Therefore,  the  two  states,  preferring  and  sincerely 
desiring  peace  and  the  maintenance  of  the  alliance, 
have  both  renounced  to  any  eventual  occupation  of 
Albania  in  case  of  the  perturbation  of  the  status 
quo. " 1 

In  ISO?  neither  power  had  any  pronounced  advantage.  If  Italy  had  no 
good  harbor  on  the  Strait  of  Otranto,  the  Austrian  port  at  Cattaro 
was  unfit  for  naval  use  because  dominated  by  Montenegrin  forts. 
Austria’s  real  naval  center  was  at  Pola,  somewhat  further  from  the 

p 

Strait  than  the  Italian  base  at  Taranto. 

The  chief  opposition  to  the  Austro-Italian  policy  of 
autonomy  for  Albania  came  from  Serbia  and  her  protector,  Russia. 
Serbia  herself  figures  only  once  in  the  net-work  of  treaties  which 
grew  up  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  An  Austrc-Serb  alliance  was 
made  in  1881  in  which  provision  was  made  for  possible  Serbian  expan- 
sion  to  the  south  — excepting  in  the  Sanjak  of  Novibazar This 


^■Tittoni,  Tommasa;  Italy*  s Fore ign  and  Colonial  Policy,  English 
edition  by  San  Severino,  Baron  Bernardo  Quaranta  di.  London  (1914). 

p.  18. 
o 

Peacock,  W. ; Italy  and  Albania,  Contemporary  Review,  vol.  107, 
p*  362. 

^Pribram;  op.  cit.  pp. 50-55. 


' 


IS 


last  provision  effectively  barred  any  Serb  progress  in  the  direction 
of  Albania.  For  the  rest,  Serbian  interests  were  cared  for  by  the 
great  Slav  power.  While  the  Austro-Serb  treaty  was  being  drafted 
at  Belgrade  the  short-lived  League  of  the  Three  Emperors  — of 
Germany,  Russia,  and  Austria  — was  signed  at  Berlin,  providing  that 
"de  nouvelles  modifications  dans  le  statu  quo  territorial  de  la 
Turquie  d'Europe  ne  pourront  s'accomplir  qu'en  vertu  d'un  commun 
accord. n x This  principle  governed  the  policies  of  Austria  and 
Russia  until  189?  when  a conference  was  held  between  Francis  Joseph 
and  Nicholas  II.  Austria  at  this  time  made  an  attempt  to  secure 
Russian  support  for  the  creation  of  an  independent  Albania  in  case 
the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans  should  be  disturbed.  Russia  evaded 
the  proposal  by  saying  that  this,  and  the  larger  problem  of  the 
partition  of  Turkey  in  Europe,  "touchent  a des  questions  d'avenir 
sur  lesquelles  il  serait  premature  et  bien  difficile  de  statuer 
actuellement . With  this  statement  Austria  was  compelled  to  be 
content.  The  attitude  of  both  powers  at  this  time  showed  con- 
clusively that  their  interests  in  Albania  were  irreconcilable. 

Russia  was  determined  to  secure  a sea-coast  for  her  protegee;  Austria 
feared  the  presence  of  a potentially  hostile  Slav  power  in  the 
southern  Adriatic  and  wished  to  continue  the  economic  dependence  of 
Serbia  on  Austrian  good-will. 

Within  Albania  itself  Italian  influence  was  increasing 
steadily  in  1907.  Here  the  rivalry  between  Italy  and  Austria  was 

Jlbid.  p. 38 . 

^Ibid.  pp. 184-195.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  conversations 
between  the  Austrian  and  Italian  foreign  ministers  referred  to  in 
the  exchange  of  notes  of  1900  took  place  in  1897.  See  above,  p.  16. 


L, 


19 


largely  commercial,  religious,  and  educational.  Until  the  beginning 
of  the  century  the  Austrian  Lloyd  steamers  had  held  a practical 
monopoly  on  the  rather  meagre  commerce  of  Albania,  but  the  Italians 
were  already  commercially  entrenched  at  Valona  and  gradually  spread 
their  sphere  of  influence  as  far  north  as  Durazzo.  By  the  opening 
of  our  period  Italian  was  the  language  of  trade  in  both  of  these 
towns.1  In  the  religious  field  Austria  was  not  easy  to  supplant. 
Treaties  with  both  the  Porte  and  the  Vatican  guaranteed  her  position 
as  protector  of  Albanian  Catholics,  and  a large  number  of  the  native 
priests  were  educated  in  Austria  and  received  regular  annuities  from 
the  Austrian  government.  The  Jesuits  and  Franciscans  who  had  charge 
of  the  numerous  schools  maintained  by  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  Albania 
were  far  more  active  in  spreading  Austrian  than  Catholic  propaganda. 
The  Church  being  under  the  control  of  Austria,  Italy  was  forced  to 
rely  largely  on  secular  weapons.  These  proved,  however,  in  the  long 
run  to  be  more  effective  among  the  essentially  non-religious 
Albanians.  The  schools  maintained  by  Austria  were  open  only  to 
Catholics  and  in  many  ways  tended  to  increase  religious  discord. 

The  Italian  institutions,  on  the  other  hand,  were  usually  under  the 

2 

control  of  laymen  and  were  attended  by  Moslems  and  Catholics  alike. 

The  propaganda  of  the  Greeks,  because  it  was  the  most 
successful,  was  perhaps  the  most  obnoxious  to  the  few  Albanian 
nationalists  existing  in  1907.  Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the 
educational  activity  of  the  Orthodox  church,  acting  aa  the  agent  of 
the  Greek  government,  in  southern  Albania.  So  effective  were  the 


^Peacock,  W. ; Italy  and  Albania.  Contemporary  Review.  Vol.107, 

Pa  363. 

floods,  H.C.;  The  Danger  Zone  of  Europe,  London  (1911).  pp. 91-93. 


. 


■ 


. 


20 

proselytizing  methods  of  these  institutions  that  few  intelligent 
Tosks  graduated  from  the  Greek  gymnasia  without  a tincture  of 
Greek  sympathy.  The  home  language,  however,  remained  Albanian, 
because  of  the  ignorance  of  the  women.  It  seems  very  probable  that 
the  Albanian  cause  must  have  been  entirely  lost  in  Northern  Epirus 
if  the  Greeks  had  been  far-sighted  enough  to  provide  educational 
facilities  for  women. 

Largely  because  of  its  geographical  position,  then, 
Albania,  with  its  fifteenth  century  civilization,  was  by  1907, 
altogether  against  the  will  of  the  Albanians,  involved  in  the  web 
of  treaty  and  intrigue  which  makes  up  twentieth  century  politics. 
The  events  of  the  years  following  are  merely  so  many  more  or  less 
logical  and  inevitable  conclusions  resulting  from  premises  estab- 
lished in  the  years  following  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  WINNING  OF  AUTONOMY 

Recent  Albanian  writers  have  endeavored  to  give  the  im- 
pression that  the  Albanians,  or  at  least  a large  portion  of  them, 
were  consciously  working  in  the  direction  of  autonomy  in  the  years 
preceding  the  Young  Turk  Revolution; ^t hat  " in  embracing  the  cause 
of  the  Turkish  Constitution,  and  in  allying  themselves  with  the 
Young  Turks,  the  Albanians  were  simply  abiding  by  the  dictates  of 
their  traditional  policy",  and,  finally,  that  the  revolts  of 
1910-12  were  the  expression  of  an  almost  unanimous  national  deter- 
mination to  secure  autonomy.  This  is  an  extremely  satisfactory 
theory  from  the  patriotic  point  of  view,  but  the  history  of  the 
period,  far  from  showing  any  traces  of  so  complete  a program,  indi- 
cates rather  that  there  was  no  considerable  feeling  of  national 
solidarity  as  late  as  1912. 

On  one  point,  however,  all  were  united  — in  their 
opposition  to  any  strengthening  of  governmental  control.  As  a 
corollary  to  this,  foreign  intervention  was  universally  feared.  In 
1903,  by  the  Miirzsteg  Program,  Russia  and  Austria  had  established 

1,1  Summing  up,  the  policy  of  the  Albanians  had  two  distinct  objects: 

1.  To  preserve  the  Ottoman  Empire  as  a means  to  their  national 
end,  so  as  to  gain  time  for  the  preparation  of  Albania. 

2.  To  secure  an  autonomous  administration  for  Albania  which 
would  serve  as  a stepping  stone  to  complete  independence." 

Chekrezi,  C.  A.;  op.cit.  p.63. 

2Ibid.  p . 66. 


' 


. 


22 

foreign  assessors  and  gendarmes  in  Macedonia.  But  foreign  super- 
vision of  tax  gathering  meant  that  the  taxes  would  actually  be 
collected,  and  a foreign  police  power  meant  the  enforcement  of 
Turkish  law,  both  of  which  results  would  be  scandalous  and  out- 
rageous infringements  on  traditional  Albanian  anarchy.  The  presence 
of  the  excellently  equipped  and  comparatively  opulent  foreign 
soldiery,  moreover,  was  a continual  source  of  disaffection  among 
the  numerous  Albanians  who  were  serving  as  junior  officers  in  the 
unpaid  and  decrepit  Turkish  army.1  Both  the  Austrian  and  the 
Russian  representatives  soon  fell  into  the  old  game  of  spreading 
the  propaganda  of  their  respective  countries,  so  that,  while  they 
remained  a source  of  irritation,  the  foreigners  did  but  little  to 
preserve  order.  In  the  eastern  areas  of  Kossovo  and  Monastir, 

however,  spasmodic  attempts  were  made  to  enforce  conscription  and 

2 

to  collect  taxes,  with  chronic  unrest  as  the  result.  The  Young 
Turks  found  willing  converts  among  these  discontented  elements. 

Most  of  the  program  of  the  revolutionists  was  quite  beyond  the  com- 
prehension of  the  "single-track"  mind  of  the  Albanian;  sufficient 
for  him  that  foreign  interference  was  to  be  ended.  The  Turk  he  had 
always  been  able  to  disobey  almost  at  will;  the  "Giaours"  — or 
foreigners  — were  more  exacting  and  persistent  task -masters. 

News  of  the  Reval  Program,  with  its  promise  of  extended 
foreign  control,  reached  Albania  in  June  of  1908  and  acted  as  a 
precipitant  for  the  accumulated  fears  of  the  mountaineers.  On 
July  3,  1908,  the  revolution  was  really  begun  by  the  flight  of 

iKnight,  E.  F. ; Turkey,  Boston  (1910).  pp. 87-89. 

^Eliot;  op.cit.  p . 3 54 . 


23 

Major  Niazi  Bey,  a Mussulman  Albanian,  to  the  hills  near  his  native 
village,  Resna.  Here  the  standard  of  revolt  was  formally  raised 
and  the  tribesmen  summoned  to  the  task  of  ridding  the  country  of 
foreign  interference  and  internal  corruption.  Within  a remarkably 
short  time  the  country  between  Resna,  Dibra,  and  Monastir  had  been 
won  over  to  the  Young  Turk  cause.1  Other  revolutionary  leaders, 
such  as  Enver  Bey,  started  similar  revolts  in  various  parts  of 
western  Macedonia. 

The  success  of  these  more  or  less  spasmodic  and  uncon- 
nected movements  was  practically  assured  by  a great  gathering  of 
Albanians  at  Ferisovitch,  called  partly  to  protest  against  foreign 
intervention  in  general  as  contemplated  under  the  Reval  Program, and 
partly  to  end  the  vicious  activities  of  the  Austrian  consul,  under 
whose  protection  it  was  believed  that  brothels  and  gambling  houses 
were  demoralizing  the  younger  men  of  the  district.  Some  sort  of 
telegram  was  sent  by  this  gathering  to  the  Sultan  at  the  instigation 
of  the  Young  Turk  representatives.  Inasmuch  as  the  meeting  was 
held  under  the  auspices  of  a supporter  of  Abdul  Hamid,  this  message 
was  probably  a more  or  less  indefinite  petition  for  reform,  but  by 
the  time  it  reached  Constantinople  Young  Turk  telegraph  operators 

had  changed  the  form  so  that  the  Constitution  was  categorically 
2 

demanded.  It  was  this  telegram  which  convinced  Abdul  Hamid  of  the 
futility  of  resistance;  as  Dr.  Dillon  says,  "When  the  Sultan  became 
aware  of  the  defection  of  his  most  loyal  defenders,  he  probably 

^Knight;  op.cit.  p.133. 

2See  Woods;  op.cit.  p.95,  and  Pears,  op.cit.  pp. 287-88  for  state- 
ments of  the  purpose  and  importance  of  this  meeting. 


* 


■ 


24 

uttered  the  Turkish  equivalent  of  Caesar's  'tu  quoque  fili  mi,' 
and  resigned  himself  to  the  ine vi table . " ^ 

The  formal  granting  of  the  Constitution  was  celebrated 
riotously  in  Albania,  headsmen  of  the  tribes  assembling  at  Scutari 
to  swear  a "bessa"  — the  Albanian  Peace  of  God.  The  Mirdites 
alone  held  back.  Their  ruler,  Prenk  Bib  Doda,  had  been  a virtual 
prisoner  at  Constantinople  since  the  suppression  of  the  Albanian 
League.  Until  he  should  return,  his  subjects  would  have  nothing  to 
do  with  the  new  government.  The  Young  Turks,  as  yet  unsure  of 
their  position,  released  the  Prenk  at  once,  and  the  Mirdites  also 
joined  the  supporters  of  the  Constitution.  Gatherings  were  held  at 
the  chief  Albanian  towns  to  arrange  for  the  opening  of  native 
schools,  and  a congress  was  called  to  devise  a national  alphabet. 

A feeling  of  child-like  buoyancy  and  hope  was  apparent  everywhere. 
Miss  Durham,  who  was  travelling  through  the  mountain  districts  at 
this  time,  encountered  grotesquely  distorted  ideas  of  the  new 
regime : 

"Every  one  had  a huge  list  of  things  — trifles 
such  as  railways,  roads,  factories,  and  above  all, 
free  schools  — that  were  desired  of  the  government, 
and  no  one  had  the  least  idea  that  he  himself  had  a 
duty  towards  the  government.  The  'Constitution'  was 
a sort  of  'magic  dicky'  that  was  to  create  every- 
thing out  of  nothing.  A rumor  that  they  might  have 
to  contribute  either  work  or  money  in  order  to  attain 
these  things  caused  great  wrath. "2 

Discordant  elements  began  to  appear  almost  at  once. 
Officials  without  any  knowledge  of  the  country  were  appointed  by  the 

^Dillon,  E.  J.;  Foreign  Affairs.  Contemporary  Review, vol . 94, p. 389 . 

^Durham,  M.  E. ; Constitution  in  North  Albania,  Contemporary  Review, 
vol.  94,  pp.  540-41,  ~ 


. 


25 

Young  Turks,  and  their  blunders  soon  revived  all  the  old  animosi- 
ties. While  the  festivities  were  still  in  progress  in  Scutari  the 
arrest  of  several  tribesmen  for  an  offense  not  punishable  under 
tribal  law  again  put  the  mountaineers  in  a state  of  unrest.  In  Old 
Serbia  the  military  command  was  given  to  Djavid  Pasha,  who  had  been 
forced  to  flee  for  his  life  from  the  tribesmen  of  this  same  area 
but  a short  time  before.1  Djavid  immediately  and  conclusively 
proved  himself  unregenerate  in  the  eyes  of  the  Albanians  by  under- 
taking an  unsuccessful  expedition  against  Isa  Boletin,  a popular 
and  influential  chief  who,  like  his  mediaeval  prototype,  the  robber 
baron,  had  long  kept  his  followers  prosperous  by  periodical  raids 
on  the  unwarlike  peasants  of  Macedonia.  Other  sources  of  friction 
were  all  too  numerous.  Educated  Albanians  felt  that  their  services 
to  the  cause  of  the  Revolution  were  ignored  when  administrative 
positions  were  being  filled;  enterprising  assessors  undertook  to 
collect  arrears  in  taxes  in  addition  to  the  comparatively  heavy 
current  levies;  the  attempt  to  destroy  all  fortified  houses  and  to 
disarm  the  mountaineers  seemed  a blow  at  the  traditional  defenses 
of  the  Albanian  against  governmental  tyranny.  Most  heartily 
detested  of  all,  however,  was  the  order  for  the  taking  of  a census. 
The  delicate  Albanian  sense  of  honor  resented  questions  concerning 
the  feminine  members  of  the  households.  Also,  the  tribesmen  had  a 
shrewd  suspicion  that  the  census  would  form  the  basis  for  new  taxes 
and  for  conscription.  Already  young  men  were  being  drafted  into 
the  hated  Yemen,  or  Arabian  service.^ 

gWoods;  op.cit.  p.98. 

'Brailsford,  H.  N. ; Albanians . Turks . and  Russians.  Contemporary 
Review,  vol.  100,  p.335.  


. 


26 


An  uneasy  state  of  peace  continued  until  the  spring  of 
1910.  Then  a great  meeting  of  Albanians  was  held  at  Prishtina 
and  an  ultimatum  sent  to  Constantinople  protesting  against  the 
Young  Turk  policy  of  "Ottomanization”  and  all  that  went  with  it. 

The  Porte  replied  by  sending  a large  army,  including  many  Kurdish 
troops,  to  the  disaffected  area.  The  unrest,  the  Turks  claimed, 
was  entirely  caused  by  chieftains  who  disliked  the  new  regime 
because  the  subsidies  of  Abdul  Hamid  were  now  cut  off.1  The  error 
of  this  statement  was  proved  by  the  vigorous  opposition  encountered 
by  the  army.  The  Katchanik  Pass,  a vulnerable  point  on  the  Uskub- 
Mitrovitsa  railway  line,  was  occupied  by  the  Albanians  and  defended 
until  the  arrival  of  overwhelming  Turkish  reinforcements.  The 
revolt  then  degenerated  into  a scattering  guerilla  struggle  which 
only  succeeded  in  keeping  alive  Albanian  animosity  for  the  Young 
Turk.  The  lull,  however,  merely  meant  that  the  tribesmen  were  out 
of  ammunition.  Brailsford,  speaking  of  earlier  uprisings,  says, 
"the  Albanians  seem  incapable  of  the  long  years  of  preparation 
which  precede  a Bulgarian  revolt.  They  collect  no  war  chest,  and 
they  amass  no  magazines  of  ammunition.  Their  risings,  accordingly, 
are  alarming  but  brief  adventures,  and  if  the  Turks  can  survive 
until  each  man  has  shot  away  his  beltful  of  cartridges,  they  may 
enjoy  their  triumph  — until  the  following  spring."2 

During  the  revolt  of  1910  great  numbers  of  Albanians  had 
fled  across  the  Montenegrin  frontier.  These,  in  the  course  of  the 

^Pears,  Sir  Edwin;  Developments  in  Turkey,  Contemporary  Review, 
vo 1 . 97,  p. 701. 

2Brailsford;  Macedonia,  p.267. 


2? 


winter,  gradually  drifted  back  to  their  homes,  bringing  with  them 
confused  rumors  of  promised  Montenegrin  aid  against  the  Turks. 
Circulars  purporting  to  have  been  written  by  Riciotti  Garibaldi  and 
promising  the  aid  of  his  ’’Red  Shirts"  in  a war  for  Albanian  inde- 
pendence were  mysteriously  distributed.*3"  These  extremely  vague 
promises  of  foreign  help  were  sufficient  to  arouse  once  more  to 
action  the  mountain  men,  already  incensed  by  the  terrible  blunder 
of  the  governor  of  Scutari,  who  had  proclaimed  a Holy  War  against 

the  Christian  tribes,  and  by  the  barbarous  methods  used  by  the 

2 

Kurdish  troops  in  "pacifying"  disaffected  areas.  Soon  practically 
all  of  northern  Albania  was  in  arms.  The  strength  of  the  particu- 
larist  spirit  was  now  clearly  shown.  The  Mirdites,  who  had  remained 
inactive  in  the  first  revolt,  again  refused  to  join  with  the  moun- 
tain men.  Even  among  the  latter  there  was  very  little  cooperation, 
some  of  the  tribes  refusing  either  to  give  help  to  their  fellow 
insurgents  or  to  receive  aid  from  them. 

The  Montenegrins  were  furious  at  the  premature  action  of 
the  Albanians,  which  had  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Powers  to 
this  corner  of  Europe  before  Montenegro  was  ready  for  action.  Large 
quantities  of  arms  and  ammunition  were  sent  more  or  less  openly 
across  the  frontier,  but  the  Montenegrin  army  could  do  nothing,4 
especially  when  Russia  declined  to  back  the  Black  Mountain  in  a 

^Durham,  M.  E.;  The  Struggle  for  Scutari.  London  (1914).  p.19. 

^Miller,  William;  The  Ottoman  Empire , 1801-1913 , Cambridge  (191b). 
p. 495. 

3_ 

Durham,  op.cit.  p.45. 

orailsford,  H.  N.;  Albanians . Turks . and  Russians,  pp. 329-30. 


. 


28 

proposed  Balkan  War.  There  could  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  result 
of  the  revolt  now  that  Montenegro  was  barred  from  active  participa- 
tion. The  lowlands  of  eastern  Albania  were  occupied  by  the  Turks 
early  in  June,  and  the  Sultan  himself  came  to  Old  Serbia  to  cele- 
brate the  return  of  peace.  An  amnesty  for  the  rebels  was  proclaimed 
on  the  eleventh  of  June  in  connection  with  a great  military  review, 
and  five  days  later,  before  the  tomb  of  Murad  I,  the  Sultan 
announced  that  financial  aid  would  be  given  for  the  rebuilding  of 
devastated  areas,  and  that  the  Albanian  nationality  would  henceforth 
receive  recognition.1 

These  terms  were  communicated  to  the  mountaineers  later 

in  the  month,  accompanied  by  a threat  of  annihilation  if  they  were 
2 

refused.  The  Malissori,  still  blindly  hoping  for  foreign  help, 
continued  their  struggle.  By  July,  however,  most  of  the  women  and 
children  of  the  tribesmen  and  a great  many  of  the  fighting  men  as 
well  had  been  forced  into  Montenegro.  An  armistice  was  concluded 
early  in  July  and  continued,  despite  numerous  violations,  through 
the  whole  month.  By  the  beginning  of  August  the  patience  of  the 
Montenegrins  was  exhausted,  and  the  Albanians  were  forced  to  make 
peace  as  best  they  could  and  to  leave  Montenegrin  territory.  The 
Turks  agreed  to  grant  an  amnesty  to  the  rebels,  to  aid  in  the 
reconstruction  of  the  burned  villages,  to  suspend  all  taxes  for  two 
years,  and  to  construct  roads  and  schools.  The  Albanians  were  to  be 
given  the  privilege  of  carrying  arms  outside  of  the  towns  and  were 

^ears,  Sir  Edwin;  op.cit.  pp.  30-21. 

2 Durham,  M.  E.;  op.cit.  pp. 58-59. 


' 


V 


29 


not  to  be  forced  to  serve  in  the  Yemen.-1  There  was  one  significant 
omission  in  the  agreement.  All  through  the  negotiations  the 
Albanians  insisted  on  the  necessity  for  a European  guarantee  of  the 
terms  in  the  hope  that  by  this  expedient  the  benefits  of  foreign 
interference  might  be  secured  without  the  drawbacks.  The  Young 
Turks  absolutely  refused  to  accede  to  this  suggestion,  however, 
and  in  the  end  the  Albanians  were  forced  to  yield. 

The  winter  of  1911-12  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Turk  in 
Albania.  The  Malissori  returned  to  their  ruined  homes  defeated  but 
only  temporarily  subdued.  The  government  made  a determined  but 
tragically  ineffectual  effort  to  fulfill  the  terms  of  peace,  for  at 
every  turn  the  hopeless  inefficiency  of  the  administrative  machinery 
was  glaringly  apparent.  Money  sent  to  Scutari  for  relief  purposes 
was  diverted  on  the  way  by  unpaid  officials.  The  war  with  Italy 
made  the  importation  of  house-building  materials  and  clothing 
exceedingly  difficult.  As  usual,  the  incompetence  of  the  Turkish 
officials  complicated  the  situation.  The  difficulties  with  which 
the  government  was  forced  to  cope  meant  little  to  the  Albanian, 
however.  He  only  knew  that  his  house  was  burned,  that  there  was  no 
harvest,  and  that  the  promises  of  the  Turk  were,  as  usual,  not 
being  kept.  A violent  dispute  arose  also  over  the  interpretation 
of  the  terms  of  peace.  The  Turks  claimed  that  they  had  promised  to 
restore  the  "maisons"  only  of  the  insurgents;  the  Albanian  copy  of 
the  agreement  read  "immeubles"  i.e.,  all  permanent  improvements . s 


^Miller;  op.cit.  p.496. 

woods,  H.  C. ; The  Situation  in  Albania  and  Macedonia.  Fortnightly 
Review,  vol.  91,  pp. 913-14. 


' 


30 

Then,  to  complete  the  worries  of  the  Vali,  the  tribes  which  had  not 
rebelled  poured  into  Scutari  demanding  the  same  indemnities  as  the 
rebels,  insisting,  logically  enough,  that  it  was  not  fair  to 
penalize  those  who  had  remained  loyal.  Arguments  were  of  no  avail 
against  the  outraged  non-combatants,  who  left  vowing  that  next 
year  their  turn  would  come. 

In  the  spring  all  northern  Albania  prepared  for  the 
annual  revolt.  Even  the  Mirdites  were  now  showing  signs  of  dis- 
loyalty, since  the  Young  Turks  had  chosen  this  inauspicious  time  to 
deprive  Prenk  Beb  Doda  of  his  suzerainty  over  neighboring  tribes. 

A perfunctory  request  for  administrative  autonomy  was  made  by  the 
Albanians,  and  quite  as  mechanically  denied  by  the  government.  The 
usual  spasmodic  unorganized  warfare  then  began.  To  all  appearances 
this  was  to  be  a typical  Albanian  revolt,  ending  with  the  usual 
concessions  which  would  be,  again  as  usual,  never  carried  out.  But 
this  time  the  Turkish  soldiery  in  Albania  took  command  of  the 
situation,  as  in  1908.  Their  discontent  had  been  growing  steadily 
as  the  Italian  war  went  more  and  more  against  the  Turks.  The 
government  of  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  was  blamed  for  all 
the  misfortunes  of  the  Empire,  and  demands  for  the  formation  of  a 
new  cabinet  were  openly  made  by  the  soldiers.  In  the  latter  part 
of  June  several  large  detachments  revolted,  and  many  actually 
joined  forces  with  the  Albanians.  Largely  because  of  this  discon- 
tent the  Committee  government  was  replaced  in  July  by  a more  liber- 
al ministry  which  succeeded  in  arranging  an  armistice.  In  August 
the  furthest  demands  of  the  insurgents  were  met  by  the  granting  of 
administrative  autonomy  to  the  vilayets  of  Scutari,  Kossovo,  Janina,  I 


■ 

' 


and  Monastir,  the  four  to  comprise  the  province  of  Albania.1 

In  the  short  space  of  four  years,  therefore,  the 
Albanians  had  changed  from  the  staunchest  supporters  to  the 
bitterest  enemies  of  Turkish  dominion  in  Europe.  The  Young  Turk 
policy  of  " Ot t oraani zat ion"  was  the  most  potent  factor  in  the 
creation  of  discontent,  but  the  inexperience  and  lack  of  effi- 
ciency of  the  officials  appointed  by  the  new  government,  and  the 
skilful  exploitation  by  Russia,  acting  through  Montenegro,  of 
this  favorable  opportunity  to  weaken  the  Turkish  power  were  also 
active  forces.  Albanian  nationalism,  as  a force  working  for 
independence,  was  a negligible  consideration,  if  it  existed  at  all. 
Even  in  the  last  and  most  successful  rebellion  of  these  years  the 
Albanians  did  not  present  a united  front.  The  Tosks  took  but 
little  part  in  the  revolt,  and  even  some  of  the  northern  tribes, 
despite  the  almost  unbearable  maladministration,  showed  but  slight 
interest . 


^Chekrezi,  op.cit.  pp. 68-69. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  AND  ALBANIAN  INDEPENDENCE 

Balkan  history  is  rarely  pleasant  reading;  the  story  of 
the  years  1912  and  1913  is  one  of  the  most  disgusting  in  all  human 
history.  Twentieth  century  civilization  loses  much  of  its  glamor 
when  the  record  of  the  modern  Greek  is  compared  with  that  of  his 
classical  ancestor,  and  there  is  nothing  to  be  found  in  all  the 
chronicles  of  the  great  Slavic  invasions  of  mediaeval  times  which 
does  not  seem  temperate  and  humane  when  read  in  conjunction  with 
the  starkly  horrible  tale  of  the  "wars  of  liberation”  as  told  by 
impartial  investigators.1  Even  in  the  conduct  of  the  Great  Powers 
there  is  but  slight  evidence  of  any  but  unscrupulously  selfish 
motives.  Upon  almost  every  event  of  this  period  the  Albanian 
question  had  some  influence,  direct  or  indirect.  The  fate  of 
Albania  itself,  however,  was  determined  by  the  attitude  of  the  two 
rival  groups  of  Powers,  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente, 
so  that  but  little  attention  need  be  devoted  either  to  the  actions 
of  the  Albanians  themselves,  or  to  the  military  operations  of  the 
Balkan  allies  after  the  war  was  really  under  way.  The  main  prob- 
lem will  be  to  show  clearly  the  balancing  and  adjusting  of  rival 
ambitions  which  resulted,  in  the  first  place,  in  the  setting  up  of 
an  Albanian  state  of  any  kind,  then  in  the  fixing  of  admittedly 

■^Dotation  Carnegie  pour  la  Paix  Internationale;  E?nquete  dans  les 
Balkans . Rapport . Paris  (1914) . 


■ 


| 


33 


unjust  boundaries  for  the  new  state. 

The  creation  of  an  autonomous  Albania,  while  not  the 
sole  cause  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  made  war  practically  inevitable, 
and  hastened  the  opening  of  hostilities.  The  alliances  between 
Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece  were  made  early  in  1912,  before  the 
Albanian  revolt  had  assumed  serious  proportions.  The  success  of 
the  uprising  had  a very  decided  effect  on  the  policies  of  the 
allies,  however.  As  M.  Guechoff,  then  premier  of  Bulgaria, 
remarks,  "tous  ces  evenements  . . . eurent  un  echo  si  puissant  a 
Sofia,  Belgrade,  Athenes  et  Cettigne  qu'il  etait  facile  de  prevoir 
qu'ils  ne  manqueraient  pas  de  provoquer  des  consequences  graves."^ 
The  fact  that  all  four  of  the  western  vilayets  were  put  under 
Albanian  control  was  especially  distasteful,  since  each  of  the 
states  hoped  to  secure  a portion  of  this  territory.  Montenegro, 
which  had  been  advocating  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  Malissori 

p 

province  in  northern  Albania  under  Montenegrin  protection,  now 
abandoned  all  pretense  of  pacific  intent  and  openly  prepared  for 
war.  The  Serbian  plan  for  the  division  of  European  Turkey  into 
spheres  of  influence  for  the  four  neighboring  states  was  also 

■7 

frustrated  by  the  creation  of  this  "grande  Albanie . 

The  seeds  of  the  Second  Balkan  War,  moreover,  may  be 
found  in  the  failure  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  to  make  any  provision 
against  possible  successful  opposition  to  Serbian  expansion  in 
Albania.  In  view  of  previous  Austrian  declarations  on  the  subject 

^Guechoff,  Iv.-E.;  L* alliance  Balkanique,  Paris  (1915).  p.82. 

^Evans,  Sir  Arthur;  The  Drama  of  the  Balkans,  Contemporary  Review, 
vol.  102,  p.775. 

^Dotation  Carnegie,  op.cit.  p. 29. 


34 

it  is  highly  improbable  that  the  possibility  of  such  interference 
should  have  been  overlooked.  Rather,  it  would  seem,  the  Serbians 
relied  on  a combination  of  two  factors  — suddenness  of  attack, 
and  Russian  support.  The  declarations  of  both  Serbian  and 
Montenegrin  military  men  before  the  war  indicate  that  little 
opposition  was  expected  on  the  Albanian  front.  The  Montenegrins 
boasted  of  their  ability  to  take  Scutari  within  two  weeks  of  the 
opening  of  hostilities,  and  were  so  confident  that  but  slight 
opposition  would  be  met  that  practically  no  provision  was  made  for 
the  care  of  wounded  soldiers.1  It  was  hoped,  therefore,  that  the 
rapid  completion  of  the  conquest  of  northern  Albania  would  permit 
the  Allies  to  confront  Austria  with  a fait  accompli  before  the 
latter  power  should  have  time  to  protest;  if  any  opposition  were 
then  shown,  Russia  could  be  relied  upon  to  back  up  the  claims  of 
the  Slav  powers.  Unfortunately  for  Serbia,  neither  calculation 
was  justified  by  the  event.  To  be  sure,  the  Malissori  did  join 
forces  with  the  Montenegrins,  in  spite  of  the  "betrayal"  of  1911, 
but  the  Mirdites,  bribed  by  the  Young  Turks  with  gifts  of  arms 
and  with  promises  of  concessions,  passively  resisted  the  invasion, 
while  the  Moslems  showed  the  strength  of  Islam  by  refusing  to 

p 

cooperate  with  their  Christian  "liberators."  Delayed  partly  by 
Turkish  and  Albanian  opposition,  but  even  more  by  the  appalling 
lack  of  efficiency  in  their  own  army,  the  Montenegrins  did  not 
invest  Scutari  until  late  in  November.  The  importance  of  this 

^Durham,  M.  E.;  The  Struggle  for  Scutari,  pp.67,  182-83. 

2Nevinson,  W. ; The  Causes  of  Victory  and  the  Spoils , Contemporary 
Review,  vol.  103,  p.9. 


35 

delay  and  of  the  subsequent  resistance  of  Scutari  can  scarcely  be 
1 

overestimated.  During  these  precious  weeks  Austria  was  able,  not 
only  to  stir  up  a respectable  amount  of  anti-Serb  sentiment  at 
home,  b it  also  to  line  up  the  other  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
solidly  for  an  autonomous  Albania. 

The  sentiment  of  the  Triple  Allies  with  regard  to  the 
Albanian  question  was  crystallized  early  in  November  by  the  note 
which  M.  Poincare,  then  premier  of  France,  addressed  to  the  Powers 
asking  for  expressions  of  "disinterestedness”  in  regard  to  the 

p 

territorial  questions  involved  in  the  Balkan  struggle.  This 

request,  which  was  euphemistically  referred  to  as  "unfortunate” 

by  even  the  Entente  press  within  a few  days  of  its  publication, 

was  received  with  a storm  of  disapproval  by  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Public  agitation  began  immediately  in  the  Viennese  press  in  favor 

of  Albanian  independence,  and  Germany  showed  every  sign  of  sup- 

2 

porting  her  ally  in  this  policy.  Premier  Asquith  sought  to  calm 
the  storm  in  his  Guildhall  speech  of  November  S.  In  this  he 
pleaded  against  "the  raising  and  pressing  of  isolated  questions, 
which,  if  handled  separately  and  at  once,  seem  likely  to  lead  to 
irreconcilable  divergences,  but  which  might  assume  a different  and 
perhaps  a more  tractable  aspect  if  they  are  reserved  to  be  dealt 

1”The  resistance  of  the  garrison  of  Yanina  to  the  Greeks  and  the 
resistance  of  the  garrison  of  Scutari  to  the  Serbs, had  more  direct 
effect  on  the  political  results  of  the  war  than  all  the  bloody 
battles  and  combats  in  the  field.  For  it  was  the  resistance  of 
these  garrisons  that  made  it  possible  for  Europe  to  establish  an 
autonomous  Albania.”  — Courtney  of  Penwith,  ed.;  Nationalism 
and  War  in  the  Near  East , Oxford  (1915) . p.201. 

^The  London  Times,  1912,  Nov.  2,  p.5,col.  1. 

^Ibid.  Nov.  4,  p.S,  col.l;  Nov. 6,  p.7,  col.l. 


36 

with  from  the  wider  point  of  view  of  a general  settlement."^  This 
sensible  suggestion  had  a noticeably  sobering  effect,  but  the 
Austrian  press  was  inclined  to  look  somewhat  askance  at  another 
portion  of  the  same  speech,  where,  amid  wild  applause,  according 
to  the  Times . Mr.  Asquith  proclaimed  that  "upon  one  thing  I believe 
the  general  opinion  of  Europe  to  be  unanimous  — that  the  victors 

p 

are  not  to  be  robbed  of  the  fruits  which  cost  them  so  dear." 
Viennese  editorial  comment  on  this  might  be  condensed  into 
Priscilla’s  demure  "Speak  for  yourself,  John,"  and  the  semi- 
official press  openly  stated  that  Ismail  Kemal  Bey,  later  head  of 
the  Provisional  Government  of  Albania,  who  was  then  in  Vienna, 

had  received  assurances  from  the  Austrian  government  that  Albania 

3 

would  be  set  up  as  an  independent  state.  Italian  governmental 
feeling  as  shown  in  the  ministerial  press  reflected  views  very 
similar  to  those  of  Austria,  and  Germany,  despite  Socialist  anti- 
Austrian  demonstrations,  went  to  the  length  of  securing  assurances 
from  the  Russian  foreign  minister  to  the  effect  that  Russia  would 
not  go  to  war  over  the  question  of  an  Adriatic  port  for  Serbia.4 

Deserted  by  her  traditional  supporter,  and  confronted  by 
the  united  opposition  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  Serbia  began  to 
recede  from  her  extreme  position.  On  November  21,  the  Serbian 
Foreign  Office  intimated  that  the  Balkan  Allies  might  consent  to 

5 

the  creation  of  an  independent  Albania.  A few  days  later  M. 
Pashitch,  the  Serbian  prime  minister,  confirmed  this  report,  but 


Jlbid.  Nov.  11, 
“Ibid.  Nov.  11, 
-Ibid.  Nov.  11, 
|lbid.  Nov.  15, 
"Ibid.  Nov.  32, 


p.7,  col.  1 
p.9,  col. 9. 
p.7,  col.l. 
p.5,  col. 2. 
p . 5,  col . 1 . 


37 

added  that  "it  is  essential  that  Serbia  should  possess  about  fifty 
kilometers  from  Alessio  to  Durazzo.  This  coastline  would  be  joined 
to  what  was  formerly  Old  Serbia  approximately  by  the  territory 
between  a line  from  Durazzo  to  Ochrida  Lake  in  the  south,  and  one 
from  Alessio  to  Djakova  in  the  north."1  The  Albanian  declaration 
of  independence  issued  on  November  28  by  a council  of  chiefs  meet- 
ing at  Valona  under  the  leadership  of  Ismail  Kemal  Bey  might  almost 
be  considered  the  Austro-Italian  answer  to  the  Serbian  statement, 
since  the  action  of  Ismail  was  taken  only  after  assurances  of  sup- 
port had  been  received  from  the  Triple  Alliance. r 

Early  in  December,  at  the  suggestion  of  England,  the 
Powers  decided  that  the  larger  international  questions  created  by 
the  Balkan  War  should  be  settled  by  an  informal  conference  of  their 
ambassadors  stationed  at  some  European  capital.  Austrian  accept- 
tance  of  this  plan  was  hastened  by  unmistakable  indications  that 
Russia  was  contemplating  a modification  of  her  Adriatic  policy. 
Rumors  of  extensive  mobilization  of  Russian  troops  persisted 
despite  repeated  denials  of  any  military  activity  by  Russia.  Just 
before  the  meeting  of  the  ambassadors  the  situation  was  made  even 
more  tense  by  the  announcement  that  orders  preliminary  to  mobiliza- 

^Ibid.  Nov.  25,  p.8,  col. 2. 

^Chekrezi,  op.cit.  p.78. 

It  is  interesting,  in  view  of  the  statements  made  by  Chekrezi  and 
other  Albanian  writers  concerning  the  universal  desire  of  the 
Albanians  for  independence,  to  note  that  Ismail  Kemal  Bey,  in 
informing  the  Turkish  government  of  the  action  of  the  Valona 
assembly,  emphasized  strongly  the  continued  affection  of  the 
Albanians  for  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  for  the  Caliphate  and  sought 
to  excuse  the  declaration  of  independence  on  the  ground  of  stra- 
tegic necessity,  v.  London  Times,  1912,  Dec.  6,  p.7,  col. 3. 


- 


■ 


38 


tion  had  been  sent  to  all  reservists  of  the  German  army,  and  that 
the  Austrian  Minister  of  War  and  Chief  of  Staff  had  been  replaced 
by  officers  of  avowedly  militaristic  sympathies.1  The  meetings  of 
the  ambassadors,  held  at  London,  went  on  without  regard  to  the 
wrangling  which  broke  out  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  Allies 
immediately  after  the  opening  of  the  peace  congress.  All  the 
sittings  of  the  Council  were  secret;  even  rumors  concerning  their 
activities  were  surprisingly  few.  On  December  20  the  first 
important  results  were  announced  in  the  following  communique: 

"The  Ambassadors  have  recommended  to  their 
governments,  and  the  latter  have  accepted,  the 
principle  of  Albanian  autonomy,  together  with  a 
provision  guaranteeing  to  Serbia  commercial 
access  to  the  Adriatic.  The  six  governments 
have  agreed  in  principle  on  these  two  points."2 

This  declaration  marks  the  end  of  the  first  phase  of  the 
Albanian  question.  In  this  the  Triple  Alliance  had  won  a signal 
victory,  largely  through  the  faulty  diplomatic  tactics  of  France 
and  Russia,  and  the  even  greater  military  blunders  of  the  Balkan 
Allies.  Out- manoeuvred  on  this  point,  however,  Russia  dug  herself 
in,  like  the  Turks  at  Scutari,  and  prepared  to  reduce  to  a minimum 
the  results  of  her  defeat. 


^London  Times,  1912,  Dec.  11,  p.8,  col.l. 
2Ibid.  Dec.  11,  p.8,  col.  1. 


. . 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  STATE 


Much  good  ink  has  been  wasted  in  hysterical  damning  or 


praising  of  the  Powers  for  the  establishment  of  an  independent 
Albania.  Many  reputable  writers  go  even  farther  than  Miss  Newbigin 
in  hinting  that  "some  at  least  of  the  Powers  foresaw  that  an 
independent  Albania  might  lead  to  quarrelling  among  the  Balkan 
Powers,"  and  that  "their  motive  in  supporting  its  erection  was  not 
wholly  uninfluenced  by  this  possibility."1  Apostles  of  the 
millennium,  on  the  other  hand,  hailed  this  as  the  beginning  of  the 
era  of  self-determination  for  all  peoples.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
believe,  however,  either  that  the  Powers  had  suddenly  become  disin- 
terested philanthropists,  or  that  there  was  a diabolical  plot  back 
of  the  decision  of  December  20.  As  shown  above, ^ the  primary 
interest  of  both  Italy  and  Austria  was  to  prevent  the  eastern 
Adriatic  littoral  from  coming  into  the  hands  of  a potentially 
hostile  power.  Greece  and  Serbia  were  not  then,  in  themselves, 
dangerous  neighbors.  But  behind  Serbia  loomed  the  omnipresent 
Russian  menace,  and  in  a Greek  Strait  of  Corfu  Italy  saw  a naval 
base  for  any  maritime  power  in  alliance  with  Greece  against  Italy. 
Other  factors,  notably  Austrian  resentment  at  the  collapse  of  her 
schemes  to  secure  an  outlet  on  the  Aegean,  were  doubtless  present, 


1 


I . ; Geographical  Aspects  of  Balkan  Problems , N . Y. 


40 

but  they  merely  strengthened  a policy  long  since  determined  upon. 

Selfish  this  policy  certainly  was,  and  there  is  every 

reason  to  believe  with  Professor  Hazen  that  the  Albanian  ’’fiasco'1 

was  directly  responsible  for  the  Second  Balkan  War.'1'  We  might  even 

go  so  far  as  to  say  with  Mr.  Dominian  that  "the  inhabitants  of 

Albania  are  totally  devoid  of  national  feeling.”^  But  even  then  it 

would  not  necessarily  follow,  as  Mr.  Dominian  further  implies,  that 

"under  these  circumstances,  partition  of  the  country  between  Greece 

and  Serbia  might  not  have  been  incompatible  with  national  aspira- 
3 

tions."  Balkan  history  for  centuries  has  centered  around  the 

attempts  of  subject  peoples  to  secure  their  emancipation.  To 

divide.  Albania  between  her  neighbors  would  be  merely  to  start 

another  chapter  in  the  bloody  story.  Despite  the  lack  of  national 

solidarity,  the  strength  of  the  Albanian  hatred  for  Greek  and  Serb 

had  been  strikingly  manifest  at  least  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 

That  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  themselves  realized  this  is  shown  by  the 

measures  taken  to  exterminate  the  Albanian  elements  in  the  areas 

4 

secured  in  1913. 

After  the  announcement;  of  December  30,  1913,  there  was  a 
slight  lull  in  the  discussion  of  the  Albanian  question.  Early  in 
January  1913,  however,  Serbia  began  a systematic  agitation  against 
the  inclusion  of  Old  Serbia  in  Albania.  Some  of  the  propagandists, 
flying  in  the  face  of  all  reliable  testimony,  claimed  that  the 
territory  was  ethno graphically  Serbian;  others  dwelt  on  the  fact 

pHazen,  C.  D. ; Modern  Europe,  N.Y.  (1930)  pp.674,  677. 

^Dominian,  Leon;  Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationalitv  in  Europe, 
N.Y.  (1917).  p.194. 

~Ibid.  p.195. 

^Dotation  Carnegie,  op.cit. 


41 

that  the  wishes  of  the  Serb  majority  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
had  not  been  consulted  by  Austria-Hungary  in  1908.^  Much  was  made 
of  the  idea  that  the  Albanians  were  "intruders"  in  Old  Serbia, 
since  this  district  was  part  of  the  old  Serbian  empire.  Montenegro 
also  began  to  show  signs  of  uneasiness  when  the  Powers  showed  a 
disposition  to  include  Scutari  in  Albania.  Press  dispatches  from 
Cettigne  reported  rumors  of  an  extensive  anti-monarchist  movement. 
Using  these  reports  as  an  excuse  King  Nicholas  announced  that  the 
Montenegrins  would  never  abandon  Scutari  unless  ejected  by  force 
of  arms.  To  surrender  Montenegro’s  claim  to  that  city,  he  insisted 
would  inevitably  mean  the  overthrow  of  the  Montenegrin  royal  house? 

The  question  of  the  boundaries  for  the  newly  created 
state  soon  raised  the  international  temperature  above  even  the 
fever  heat  of  1912.  Austria  fought  valiantly  for  a line  to  the 
north  and  east  which  corresponded  roughly  with  the  ethnographical 
situation.  This  would  put  most  of  Old  Serbia  under  Albanian  con- 
trol. The  discussion  finally  focused  on  the  disposition  of  the 
town  of  Djakova,  which,  according  to  the  best  available  figures, 
contained  approximately  one  hundred  and  seventy  Albanians  to  every 
Serb.'  Serbia's  claim  to  this  area,  obviously,  must  rest  largely 
on  sentimental  grounds.  In  March  feeling  in  Germany  and  Austria 
was  further  aroused  by  well-authenticated  reports  of  the  wholesale 
massacre  of  Albanians  by  Serb  troops.  The  Austrian  government 
lodged  a formal  protest  at  Belgrade  and  even  the  more  conservative 

^London  Times.  1913,  Jan.  2,  p.7,  col. 2. 

-Ibid.  Jan.  6,  p.5,  col. 2. 

°Dillon,  E.  J. ; Alleged  Plan  to  Extirpate  Albanians.  Contemporary 
Review,  vol.  103,  pp. 577-81. 


, 


42 

German  newspapers  came  out  violently  against  these  "blood  baths."1 
After  the  customary  rumors  of  extensive  mobilization  by  Russia  and 
Austria  the  boundary  dispute  was  settled  on  March  22  by  the 
announcement  that  Scutari  was  to  be  Albanian,  while  Djakova  was  to 
go  to  Serbia.  Russia,  under  this  arrangement,  was  to  provide 
guarantees  for  the  safety  and  fair  treatment  of  the  Albanians  in 

p 

Djakova  and  the  other  regions  ceded  to  Serbia.  The  almost  univer- 
sal disgust  expressed  by  the  press  of  all  the  interested  powers  for 
this  compromise  was  sufficient  to  evoke  even  from  the  sedate  Times 
the  terse  comment  that  "if  the  essence  of  a compromise  is  that  it 
should  be  distasteful  to  both  parties,  then  in  this  sense  the  new 
frontiers  of  Albania  may  be  considered  an  unqualified  success."^ 
Montenegro  showed  her  opinion  of  the  arrangement  by 
stubbornly  continuing  the  siege  of  Scutari  despite  the  verbal 
thunders  of  the  Powers  and  the  more  material  but  no  more  effective 
international  blockade  of  the  Montenegrin  coast.  On  April  26 
Prince  Danilo  of  Montenegro  entered  Scutari  in  triumph.  Austrian 
troops  were  immediately  and  openly  massed  on  the  Montenegrin 
frontier.  Again  the  situation  turned  on  the  action  of  Russia,  and 
again  that  power  yielded.  King  Nicholas,  definitely  notified  that 
no  aid  could  be  expected  from  Russia,  decided  to  risk  the  bugbear 
of  revolution,  and  on  May  14  the  Montenegrin  army  evacuated 
Scutari,  international  troops  taking  its  place.4 

llbid.  pp. 577-80. 

^London  Times . 1913,  March  24,  p.6,  col.l. 

ibid.  March  28,  p.8,  col. 3. 

^Martens,  G.  Fr.  de ; Nouveau  Re  cue i 1 General  de  Traites . 

Troisieme  S§rie,  Tome  IX,  Leipzig, (1919) . pp.  648-49. 


■ 


- 


' 


43 

The  northern  frontier  being  fixed,  the  attention  of  the 
Ambassadors  was  transferred  to  the  south.  The  conflict  here  was 
at  first  not  so  keen.  Italy  was  willing  to  compromise  so  long  as 
her  own  interests  were  not  vitally  involved,  while  Greece  was  too 
busy  consolidating  her  position  in  Thrace  to  put  up  much  of  a 
fight  — yet.  In  August  a tentative  boundary  was  fixed  by  the 
Ambassadors,  running  from  a point  south  of  Cape  Stylos  to  the  Lake 
of  Ochrida,  Korcha  being  left  to  Albania.  An  international 
commission  was  to  lay  down  definite  lines  after  investigation  on 
the  spot.^ 

While  the  wrangling  over  the  frontiers  was  still  going 
on,  the  less  explosive  subject  of  internal  administration  was 
settled  (July  13)  at  London.  By  the  terms  of  this  "statut 
organique , Albania  was  constituted  an  autonomous  principality 
"neutralises"  under  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  The  civil  and 
financial  administration  was  to  be  in  the  hands  of  an  international 
commission  for  ten  years.4  Internal  security  was  to  be  insured  by 
the  presence  of  an  international  gendarmerie  under  Dutch  officers. 
The  ruler  of  the  new  state  was  to  be  a prince  appointed  by  the 
Powers.  Until  the  organization  of  the  new  government  should  be 
effected  the  "f onotionnement  des  autorit^s  indigenes  existantes" 
should  continue.7 

^London  Times,  1913,  Aug.  12,  p.7,  col.l. 

^Martens,  op.cit.  pp. 650-51. 

JIbid.  Arts.  1-3. 

jflbid.  Arts.  4-6. 

^Swedish,  in  the  original  document.  Ibid.  Arts.  8-11. 

Slbid.  Art.  1. 

Ibid.  Art.  7. 


44 

Just  what  these  "autorites  indigenes  existantes"  -were,  no 
one  seemed  to  know.  At  Scutari  Colonel  Philips  was  doing  his  best 
to  prevent  friction  along  the  very  hazily  defined  Montenegrin 
frontier. ^ Further  south,  at  Durazzo,  Essad  Pasha  had  set  up  a 
"provisional  government"  operating  in  opposition  to  the  one  at 
Valona,"5  which  Ismail  Kemal  Bey  was  struggling  to  keep  from  abso- 
lute dissolution.  Most  of  southern  Albania  had  been  occupied  by 
the  Greeks.  In  the  midst  of  these  conflicting  jurisdictions  the 
tribes  went  on  governing  themselves  just  about  as  they  had  under 
the  Turks,  30  that  Mr.  Nevinson,  traveling  through  the  country, 

could  report  more  peace  and  order  in  Albania  than  anywhere  else 

3 

in  the  Balkans. 

Now  that  the  most  acute  phase  of  the  Albanian  crisis  had 
been  passed,  the  Powers  showed  little  interest  in  the  organization 
of  the  new  state.  While  valuable  time  was  being  lost  in  the 
search  for  an  "available"  prince,  the  Valona  government,  with  prac- 
tically no  financial  or  military  resources,  was  rapidly  growing 
weaker.  The  tribesmen  began  to  murmur,  as  in  1908,  at  the  slowness 


■^Dillon,  E.J.;  Albania*  s Tribulations.  Contemporary  Review,  vol. 

106,  p . 116. 

^Mention  should  be  made  here  of  the  early  career  of  Essad  Pasha, 
one  of  the  most  fascinating  and  puzzling  figures  in  the  whole 
Albanian  story.  An  enthusiastic  supporter  of  the  Old  Regime  in 
Turkey  until  1908,  he  immediately  changed  his  position  when  the 
success  of  the  Revolution  seemed  assured.  He  was  in  command  of  the 
defense  of  Scutari  in  1913  and  was  accused  by  many  Albanians  of  be- 
traying the  city  into  the  hands  of  the  Montenegrins.  See  for  con- 
flicting opinions  concerning  his  integrity  and  character,  Chekrezi, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  101,  143-46;  Current  History.  New  York  Times.  July 

1920,  pp. 622-31;  Current  Opinion,  vol.  55,  p.94. 

% 

°Nevinson,  W. ; Land  of  the  Eagle,  Contemporary  Review,  vol.  104, 
pp.  312-21. 


. 


45 

of  action,  and  the  rumor  was  spread  that  Ismail  Kemal  was  selling 
the  country  to  foreign  business  men.1  In  December,  after  the 
Valona  government  had  repeatedly  declared  itself  unable  to  cope 
with  the  internal  situation,  William  of  Wied  was  chosen  "Hereditary 
Prince  of  Albania."  So  little  was  known  in  Albania  about  the  new 
ruler  that  his  aunt.  Carmen  Sylva  of  Roumania,  issued  a pamphlet 
entitled  "Who  is  He"  for  distribution  among  the  new  subjects  of 

p 

the  prince.  According  to  this  encomium  the  prince  combined  the 
bravery  of  Lancelot  with  the  virtue  of  Galahad.  Other  estimates 
were  not  quite  so  fla.ttering,  however.  In  Germany  Prince  William 
had  been  persona  non  grata  with  both  his  father  and  the  emperor 
because  of  his  "anarchist"  friends  — chiefly  fellow  doctrinaire 
philosophers  with  simple  and  practical  solutions  for  all  the 
problems  of  the  universe.3  Dr.  Dillon,  who  came  to  know  the  prince 
very  well,  described  him  as  whole-hearted,  generous,  and  chival- 
rous, but  lacking  in  initiative  and  will-power.4  The  new  ruler 
being  chosen,  the  question  of  the  status  of  the  rival  "provisional 
governments"  at  Valona  and  Durazzo  now  arose.  Ismail  Kemal  Bey 
prevented  a possible  conflict  by  patriotically  resigning  in 
January,  forcing  Essad  to  do  likewise.5  The  International 
Commission  then  took  over  the  government  until  the  arrival  of  the 
prince . 

iChekrezi:  op.cit.  pp. 120-31. 

“Ibid.  p.  1§4. 

'-’Champion  of  Human  Freedom  Who  is  to  Rule  Albania.  Current 
Opinion,  vol.  56,  pp. 22-22. 

^Dillon,  E.  J.;  The  Albanian  Tangle,  Fortnightlv  Review,  vol. 102. 
p . 15. 

5W oods,  H.  C.;  The  Situation  in  Albania,  Fortnightlv  Review, 
vol.  101,  pp. 460-72. 


46 

In  determining  the  causes  for  the  failure  of  the  new 
Albanian  state  account  must  be  taken  of  the  practical  interregnum 
between  October,  1912,  when  the  Turkish  power  lapsed,  and  the 
beginnings  of  a really  national  administration  in  January  of  1914. 
During  this  period  the  ever-present  decentralizing  and  particular - 
ist  influences  had  greatly  strengthened  their  power  on  the 
Albanians,  so  that  the  new  government  was  confronted  with  the 
problem  of  building  an  entire  system  of  administrative  machinery. 
This  task,  formidable  enough  in  itself,  was  made  vastly  more  dif- 
ficult by  the  mistakes  of  the  new  rulers. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  WILLIAM  OF  WIED 

The  outlook  when  the  International  Commission  took  over 
the  government  of  Albania  in  January  of  1914  was  decidedly 
inauspicious.  The  situation  in  the  south  was  so  strained  that  the 
boundary  commission  appointed  by  the  Powers  had  abandoned  its 
attempt  to  gather  first-hand  information  and  had  repaired  to 
Florence,  where  the  members  were  safe  from  physical  violence,  if 
not  from  propaganda.  The  Greek  army,  at  the  command  of  the 
Ambassadors,  was  preparing  to  evacuate  Northern  Epirus,  but  the 
more  radical  Greek  sympathizers  were  already  promising  trouble  for 
the  Albanian  government  when  it  should  take  over  the  district.  The 
rest  of  Albania  was  in  a state  of  uneasy  peace,  waiting,  as  in 
1908,  to  see  if  the  new  ruler  could  provide  a panacea  for  the  ills 
of  the  country. 

The  first  acts  of  Prince  William  did  not  show  any  great 
political  foresight.  Before  accepting  his  new  position  he  had 
exacted  an  international  loan  from  the  Powers,  but  he  had  neglected 
to  obtain  what  was  far  more  important,  guarantees  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  order  within  the  boundaries  of  his  realm.  The  second 
blunder  was  probably  made  on  the  advice  of  Essad  Pasha,  who,  as 
head  of  the  delegation  which  officially  offered  the  crown  of 
Albania  to  the  prince,  had  obtained  great  influence  over  the  new 
ruler.  Instead  of  making  his  headquarters  at  Valona  where  the 
support  and  advice  of  the  International  Commission  would  have  been 


. 


. 


48 

readily  available,  the  prince  set  up  his  capital  (March,  1914)  at 
Durazzo,  the  seat  of  Essad's  "provisional  government."  Inasmuch 
as  the  civil  and  financial  administration  was  officially  vested  in 
the  Commission,  this  action  greatly  impaired  the  efficiency  of  the 
government  from  the  beginning.  The  policies  of  the  royal  govern- 
ment soon  showed  all  too  clearly  that  Prince  William's  mind  was 
hopelessly  "swathed  in  the  red  tape  of  a German  bureaucrat."'1'  Early 
in  1913  M.  Philip  Nogga,  who  was  regarded  by  Dr.  Dillon  as  "the 
soul  of  such  stable  progress  as  has  already  begun  to  manifest 
itself,"*  had  sent  a note  to  the  prince  urging  the  necessity  for  a 
paternal  policy  similar  to  that  of  King  Nicholas  of  Montenegro, 
and  emphasizing  the  desirability  of  identifying  the  royal  family 
with  the  people  on  all  possible  occasions.  These  excellent  sug- 
gestions were  ignored  by  the  prince,  who  proceeded  to  set  up  a 
court  after  the  most  approved  European  model.  The  Albanians,  used 
to  the  democratic  and  easily  accessible  Turkish  beys,  found  little 
to  their  liking  in  the  ceremony  and  isolation  of  the  new  regime.4 
Within  the  government  itself  conflict  soon  arose  between  the 
ambitious  Essad,  now  minister  of  war,  and  the  Dutch  officers  of 

the  gendarmerie,  who  refused  to  obey  the  orders  of  any  one  save 

. , 5 

the  prince. 

As  the  disorganization  and  unpopularity  of  the  govern- 
ment became  more  and  more  evident,  the  attention  of  Europe  was  once 

^■Peacock.  W.;  Italy  and  Albania,  Contemporary  Review, vol.  107, 
p.  365. 

2Dillon,E. J. ; Albania's  Tribulations,  Contemporary  Review,  vol. 

106,  p. 120. 

JDillon, E. J. ; The_  Albanian  Tangle , Fortnightly  Review, vol. 102, p. 11. 
^Peacock,  op.cit.  p.366.  ^Dillon,  E.J.;  op.cit.  p.l?\ 


49 

more  turned  towards  this  storm  center  of  the  Balkans.  The  efforts 
of  statesmen,  however,  were  entirely  devoted  to  the  task  of  keep- 
ing the  Albanian  question  from  again  menacing  the  peace  of  Europe, 
while  the  press  seemed  inclined  to  take  the  new  kingdom  as  a joke. 
Prince  William  was  referred  to  as  a "candidate  for  suicide"  and  as 
the  "Lohengrin  of  the  German  court,"  while  Albania  was  given  the 
sobriquet  of  the  "comic  opera  kingdom.  This  satiric  tone  gave 
way  to  one  of  frank  uneasiness  as  the  situation  in  Northern  Epirus 
became  more  and  more  ominous.  On  March  1 the  Greek  army  had 
officially  evacuated  Albania,  but  almost  at  the  same  time  a 

"Provisional  Government  of  Northern  Epirus"  was  formed  to  oppose 

o 

Albanian  control.  Even  the  most  ardent  Phil-Hellene  must  have 
had  some  slight  doubts  as  to  M.  Venizelos'  "sincerity"  in  declar-  j 
ing  that  the  Greek  government  was  taking  no  part  in  the  Epirote 
rebellion  when  the  announcement  was  made  that  the  premier  of 
"Autonomous  Epirus"  was  an  ex-premier  of  Greece,  that  the  minister 
of  foreign  affairs  was  a member  of  the  Greek  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
and  that  the  secretary  of  war  was  a colonel  in  the  Greek  army.5 


^Literary  Digest,  vol.  48,  p.894. 

^Little  can  be  said  with  certainty  concerning  the  real  causes  of 
the  disturbances  in  Epirus,  nor  is  the  part  taken  by  the  Greek 
government  entirely  clear.  Chekrezi  (op.cit.,  pp. 130-34,  139-43), 
who  was  then  secretary  to  the  International  Commission  of  Control, 
puts  the  entire  responsibility  upon  the  government  at  Athens.  This 
statement  is  undoubtedly  an  exaggeration,  but  there  is  every  reason 
to  believe  that  Greek  soldiers  and  Cretan  bands  were  permitted  to 
take  a very  active  part  in  the  horrible  excesses  which  accompanied 
the  revolt . The  testimony  of  the  supporters  of  the  Greek  cause  is 
also  unreliable.  Ren£  Puaux's  work,  La  Malheureuse  Eplre  (Paris, 
1914),  usually  given  as  an  authority,  does  not  survive  the  most 
elementary  historical  tests  for  accuracy  and  unbiased  judgment. 

3 

Chekrezi,  op.cit.  n.131. 


50 

In  April  the  standard  of  revolt  was  raised  by  Greek 
sympathizers  in  Korcha.  Within  a few  days  all  of  southern 
Albania  was  in  arms.  The  Durazzo  government  was  practically  power- 
less since  the  International  Commission  of  Control,  acting  on  the 
theory  that  the  lack  of  trained  officers  would  lead  to  excesses, 
refused  to  sanction  expenditures  for  troops.^  The  chiefs  of  the 
northern  tribes,  moreover,  refused  to  give  aid  to  this  ''Christian 
prince  and  his  renegade  Mussulman  minister. The  struggle,  there 
fore,  was  largely  between  the  rival  factions  in  Epirus  itself.  The 
Greek  cause  was  aided  by  occasional  raids  across  the  border  by 
regular  troops  of  the  Greek  army,  but  these  unneutral  acts  were 
promptly  disavowed  by  the  government  at  Athens.  In  May,  after 
frightful  excesses  had  been  committed  by  both  sides,  the  Inter- 
national Commission  arranged  a conference  with  the  rebel  leaders 
at  Corfu.  An  agreement  was  finally  patched  up,  by  the  terms  of 
which  Epirus  was  given  practical  autonomy.^ 

It  is  impossible  to  determine  from  the  evidence  available 
the  extent  of  the  desire  for  union  with  Greece  among  the  Epirotes 
in  1914.  Some  writers  maintain  that  there  was  a majority  of 
Greeks,  ethnically  speaking, in  the  district.  Dominian,  for 
instance,  says:  "according  to  official  Turkish  statistics,  pub- 
lished in  1908,  the  region  was  peopled  by  340,000  Greeks  and  some 
149,000  Mohammedans."4  These  figures,  of  course,  mean  nothing,  so 

"''Dillon,  E.  J.  ; Albania:  to  be_  or_  not  to  be . Contemporary  Review, 
vol.  105,  p. 884. 

^Dillon;  Albanian  Tangle , Fortnightly  Review,  vol.  102,  p.7. 

^Chekrezi;  op.cit.  p.143. 

Dominian;  op.cit.  p.197. 


' 


51 

far  as  nationality  is  concerned.  "Greeks"  as  here  used  refers  to 
members  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church.  The  totals  given  by 
Dominian  are  also  far  from  accurate,  for,  although  official,  they 
are,  like  most  Turkish  statements  of  population,  based  on  rough 
estimates.  Professor  Lord  is  much  more  nearly  in  accord  with 
authorities  such  as  Brailsford  and  Dillon  in  putting  the  number  of 
Greek  Orthodox  Christians  at  120,000  and  of  Mohammedans  at  80  to 
100,000. ^ About  the  sentiments  of  the  Mohammedans  there  was  not 
much  doubt.  Living  in  the  rural  districts,  they  were  not  exposed 
to  the  influence  of  Greek  culture  and  consequently  clung  tenacious- 
ly to  their  Albanian  nationality.  Among  the  Christians  of  the 
towns,  however,  there  was  no  such  unanimity.  Here  the  language  of 
business  and  of  religion  was  Greek,  and  Greek  cultural  ideas  were 
spread  very  assiduously  by  priest  and  merchant  alike.  Even  here, 
however,  the  language  of  the  home  remained  Albanian.^  Since  no 
reliable  estimate  can  be  formed  as  to  the  number  of  Orthodox 
Epirotes  who  retained  their  loyalty  to  Albania,  the  exact  sentiment 
of  the  majority  of  the  people  in  the  district  cannot  be  known. 

The  one  thing  which  can  be  said  with  certainty  is  that  the  Greek 

case  is  not  nearly  so  strong  as  Mr.  Dominian,  Professor  Schurman, 

3 

and  other  lovers  of  Greece  believe. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Corfu  settlement  confirmed 
the  sovereignty  of  Albania  over  Northern  Epirus,  the  Epirote  revolt 

^Haskins,  C.H.,  and  Lord,  R.H.;  Some  Problems  of  the  Peace 
Conference . Cambridge,  1920.  p.278. 

flbidL.  p.278. 

°"At  this  moment  the  Greeks  of  Epirus  . . .are  resisting  to  the 
death  incorporation  in  a state  which  outrages  their  deepest  and 
holiest  sentiments  of  religion, race, nationality, and  humane  civili- 
zation." Schurman,  J.G.;  The  Balkan  Wars,  Princeton  (1914).  p.  153. 


52 

may  be  said  to  have  given  the  coup  de  grace  to  the  government  of 
William  of  Wied.  While  the  revolt  was  still  in  progress  the 
popular  opposition  to  Essad  Pasha  had  been  unmistakably  growing. 
The  "nationalists”  felt  that  the  war  in  Epirus  was  being  purposely 
mismanaged  by  Essad,  who  feared  that  the  incorporating  into  Albania 
of  the  disputed  area,  where  he  was  cordially  detested,  would  be 
follov/ed  by  his  own  downfall.  The  lower  classes,  who  expected 
that  the  coming  of  the  prince  would  mean  the  partition  of  the 
great  feudal  estates  among  the  tenants,  also  laid  all  their 
troubles  at  the  door  of  Essad,  himself  a great  landowner.1  Taking 
advantage  of  this  discontent,  the  Dutch  gendarmerie,  which  had 
from  the  first  resented  the  imperious  manner  of  Essad,  led  an 
attack  on  the  house  of  the  minister  of  war  during  the  night  of 
May  19th.  Essad  was  taken  prisoner,  although  no  charges  were 
lodged  against  him,  and  a few  days  later  was  exiled  to  Italy.  The 
other  cabinet  members,  disgusted  by  the  failure  of  the  prince  to 
take  decisive  action  against  this  high-handed  behavior  of  the 
Dutch  soldiery,  immediately  presented  their  resignations,  which 
were  refused  by  the  prince.^ 

As  soon  as  the  treatment  meted  out  to  Essad  became 
known,  his  fellow  tribesmen  sent  a protest  to  Durazzo.  As  an 
answer  to  this  the  Dutch  officers,  without  any  instructions  from 
either  the  prince  or  the  International  Commission,  ordered  the 
Malissori  troops  to  proceed  against  the  disaffected  tribe.  At 

pChekrezi;  op.cit.  pp. 143-154. 

^Dillon,  E.J.;  The  Albanian  Tangle , Fortnightly  Review,  vol.  102, 
pp.  19-23. 

3Ibld.  p. 23. 


1 . 

. -•  ’!■ .[  . ' : 

■ 


53 

Shiak  the  mountain  men  joined  forces  with  the  malcontents  and 
took  the  royal  force  prisoner.  The  news  of  this  action  caused  a 
panic  at  Durazzo,  in  the  course  of  which  the  prince  committed  the 
irreparable  blunder  of  fleeing  to  an  Austrian  battle-ship  for 
safety.  A conference  was  arranged  by  the  International  Commission 
with  the  rebels,  but  as  the  latter  would  hear  of  no  terms  short 
of  the  abdication  of  the  prince,  who,  it  was  claimed,  had  violated 
the  sacred  bessa  by  sending  troops  against  Tirana,  no  settlement 
was  effected.1  A deadlock  followed,  the  insurgents  holding  most 
of  central  Albania,  the  government  retaining  a precarious  control 
of  the  territory  around  Durazzo.  Mr.  G.  F.  Williams,  then  United 
States  Minister  to  Greece  and  Montenegro,  summed  up  the  situation 
as  follows,  after  a visit  to  Durazzo: 


"Five  ostensible  governments  were  in  sight: 
first,  the  six  Great  Powers  with  all  the  power; 
second,  the  commission  with  control  of  the  civil 
administration  and  finance;  third,  the  Holland 
gendarmerie  with  control  of  the  military;  fourth, 
the  prince  with  any  power  remaining;  fifth,  the 
ministry  with  no  powers.  Each  of  these  govern- 
ments was  fighting  every  other,  save  the  first, 
which  apparently  is  so  discordant  within  itself 
that  it  has  abandoned  all  the  rest  to  their  fate. 
All  are  cursing  the  powers  for  their  discord  and 
helplessness,  and  are  expecting  at  any  moment  to 
be  driven  out  of  Durazzo.  . . I found  a prince 
calling  himself  a king  with  no  powers,  no 
territory,  and  no  subjects,  except  his  wife  and 
children  . . . The  Wied  government  has  shown 
skill  and  success  in  one  respect  only:  it  has 
been  able  to  prevail  upon  the  various  racial 
and  religious  forces  of  Albania  to  set  upon 
each  other  with  murderous  purpose.  Hundreds 
of  Albanian  lives  have  thus  been  sacrificed  at 
the  hands  of  Albanians. "2 


pChekrezi;  op.cit.  pp. 147-48. 

''Williams,  G.F.;  An  Open  Statement,  Literary  Digest,  vol.49,p.55. 


■ • 


. 


54 

The  news  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  must  have 
come  almost  as  a relief  to  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  in 
Albania.  The  concern  of  European  diplomats  with  the  growing 
anarchy  in  the  new  state  was  actuated  largely  by  the  fear  that  the 
disorders  might  precipitate  another  crisis  in  the  European 
political  situation.  Now  that  the  long-dreaded  conflict  had  come, 
the  Albanian  problem  lost  its  larger  significance,  and  one  by  one 
the  Powers  withdrew  their  representatives,  leaving  Prince  William 
to  shift  for  himself.  Without  external  support,  however,  the 
Durazzo  government  proved  incapable  of  maintaining  itself.  On 
September  3,  1514,  the  prince  also  departed,  after  promising,  in 
a grandiose  proclamation  to  his  "beloved  people"  that  his  absence 
would  be  merely  temporary. ^ 

The  government  was  taken  over  after  the  departure  of  the 
prince  by  Burhan  Eddin  Effendi,  a son  of  Abdul  Hamid.  The 
irrepressible  Essad  embraced  the  cause  of  the  new  government  and 
received  the  posts  of  grand  vizier  and  commander-in-chief . ^ Within 
a month  he  had  himself  secured  the  presidency,  and  immediately  put 
his  government  under  the  protection  of  Italy.  After  supporting  and 
abandoning  four  successive  governments,  Essad  had  at  last  realized 

^The  message  of  the  prince  is  delightfully  ironic  in  view  of  the 
character  of  his  reign:  "I  have  therefore  decided,  in  order  not 

to  leave  unattained  the  work  to  which  I desire  to  consecrate  my 
powers  and  my  life,  that  it  will  be  best  for  me  to  go  to  the 
west  for  some  time.  But  be  assured  that,  afar  just  as  when  near, 

I shall  have  no  other  thought  but  to  labor  for  the  prosperity  of 
our  chivalrous  fatherland,  Albania."  Literary  Digest,  vol.  50, 
p.  470. 

Harriot,  J.  A.  R.  ; The  Eastern  Question.  Oxford  (1918).  p.472. 


. 


55 

his  highest  ambitions.  His  triumph  was  short-lived,  however. 

The  northern  tribes,  to  whom  the  name  of  Essad  was  anathema, 
immediately  marched  on  Durazzo,  and  were  prevented  from  taking  the 
city  only  by  the  guns  of  the  Italian  war-ships.  From  this  time 
until  the  great  Serbian  retreat  of  1915  the  power  of  Essad  was 
limited  to  the  territory  within  range  of  the  Italian  guns.  Beyond 
this  was  anarchy. 

Within  the  space  of  a year,  therefore,  the  Albanian 

state  created. by  the  Powers,  beginning,  like  Plato's  circle  of 

life,  in  nothing,  had  likewise  ended  in  nothing.  The  situation 

when  Prince  William  took  control  was  almost  hopeless;  his  own 

blunders,  the  interference  of  outside  powers,  and  the  lack  of  any 

# 

real  unity  among  the  Albanian  people  themselves,  had  made  failure 
inevitable . 


% 


, 


CHAPTER  VII 


ITALY  AND  ALBANIA 


During  the  four  years  of  war  from  1914  to  1918  Albanian 
nationalism  had  opportunity  for  that  steady  and  natural  development 
which  the  interference  of  the  Powers  had  retarded  rather  than 
helped.  With  the  war  itself  the  Albanians  had  slight  concern, 
despite  the  fact  that  their  territory  was  under  military  occupation 
almost  from  the  opening  of  hostilities.  As  soon  as  the  attention 
of  the  Powers  was  attracted  elsewhere,  the  Greeks  openly  took 
possession  of  Northern  Epirus.  The  Italians,  who  had  already 
(October  SO,  1914)  occupied  the  island  of  Saseno  off  the  Albanian 
coast,1  immediately  occupied  Valona,  under  the  pretense  of  defend- 
ing Albanian  integrity  from  the  menace  of  Greece.2  In  the  fall  of 
1915  began  the  great  southern  push  of  the  Central  Powers.  The  road 


eacock,  W. ; Italy  and  Albania,  Contemporary  Review,  vol.  107, 
pp. 361-67. 
o 

"By  this  peaceful  occupation  a military  position  was  secured  that 
later  became  an  important  naval  station  for  the  Allies, as  well  as 
a strategical  and  tactical  base  of  such  importance  that  had  it 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  the  great  military  romance 
of  the  Ealkans,  if  played  at  all,  would  have  occupied  a far  more 
narrow  stage,  and  the  whole  of  western  Albania  would  have  been 
thrown  open  to  the  Germans."  Brig.  Gen.  G.  P.  Scriven,  United 
States  military  observer  with  the  Italian  army,  in  New  York  Times, 
1919,  May  25. 

Shortly  after  the  Italian  occupation  of  Valona  most  of  northern 
Albania, including  Scutari,  was  occupied  for  a short  time  by  the 
Serbs  and  Montenegrins,  but  the  attack  of  Austria  on  Serbia  in 
1915  compelled  the  Slav  states  to  withdraw  their  troops. 

V.  Chekrezi;  op.cit.  p.158. 


. 

. 


5? 


to  Salonika  being  closed  by  the  Bulgarians,  the  Serbs  were  forced 
to  retreat  through  Albania,  closely  followed  by  the  Austrians. ^ 

By  the  spring  of  1916  all  of  Albania  north  of  a line  from  Valona 
to  Lake  Ochrida  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Central  Powers,  there  to 
remain  for  over  two  years. 

During  the  period  of  deadlock  an  almost  continuous 
struggle  for  control  of  the  area  under  Allied  occupation  went  on 
between  Italy  and  Greece  aided  by  France.  The  French,  with  head- 
quarters at  Salonika,  gradually  moved  northward  until  December 
(1916),  when  they  reached  Korcha.  In  order  to  secure  control  of 
this  city  the  French  commander  agreed  to  recognize  the  independence 
of  the  "Autonomous  Albanian  Province  of  Korcha."  A government  com- 
posed largely  of  Albanians  was  set  up,  and  the  limits  of  the  new 
"province"  were  extended  as  the  French  advanced.^  As  soon  as  the 
French  felt  themselves  firmly  established,  however,  the  Albanian 
government  was  dissolved  and  the  district  practically  turned  over 

3 

to  the  Greeks. The  Italians  had  started  a movement  to  the  south 
about  the  same  time  that  the  French  began  to  push  northward,  and, 
despite  Greek  protests,  had  taken  possession  of  all  of  southern 
Albania  by  the  end  of  1916. 

Again,  as  in  1913,  the  conflicting  aspirations  of  the 
Powers  proved  the  best  safeguard  of  Albanian  interests.  No  sooner 

^For  a vivid  description  of  this  terrible  march,  see  Labry,  Raoul; 
Avec  1* Armee  Serbe  en  Retraite , Paris  (1916) . Shorter  accounts 
may  be  found  in  Waring,  L.  F. ; Serbia,  London  (1913).  pp. 232-248, 
and  in  Devine,  Alex.;  Montenegro,  London  (1918).  pp, 74-83. 

2 

3Chekrezi;  op.cit.  p.160. 

Durham,  M.E.;  Albania  and  the  Powers,  Living  Age,  vol.  302, 
p.389. 


. 


had  the  Italians  occupied  Northern  Epirus  than  rumors  began  to 
circulate  concerning  the  contents  of  the  infamous  Treaty  of  London. 
Italy,  fearing  that  her  good  faith  might  be  in  some  degree  com- 
promised in  the  eyes  of  the  Albanians  by  the  knowledge  that  she  had 
secretly  agreed  to  the  partition  of  Albania  while  her  statesmen 
were  proclaiming  that  the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Albanian  state  was  one  of  the  Italian  war  aims,  decided  to  act 
in  advance  of  the  publication  of  the  treaty.1  On  June  3,  1917, 
General  Ferrero  solemnly  proclaimed,  "in  accordance  with  the 
orders  of  His  Majesty,  King  Victor  Emmanuel,  the  unity  and 
independence  of  the  whole  of  Albania,  under  the  shield  and  protec- 

o 

tion  of  the  Italian  Kingdom.”  During  the  following  year  every 
effort  was  made  by  the  Italians  to  strengthen  their  hold  in 
Albania.  Military  roads  were  constructed  all  through  the  occupied 
area,  schools  were  opened,  public  improvements  were  made  in  the 

3 

cities,  and  aid  was  given  to  farmers. 


\ioderwell,  H.  K.:  Two  Wavs  with  Albania,  Nation,  vol.  111. 
pp. 399-400. 

2 

'"’Chekrezi;  op.cit.  pp.  161-63. 

Chekrezi  believes  this  action  to  have  been  taken  merely  as  a ful- 
fillment of  the  war  aims  of  the  Italians.  The  coincidence  between 
the  announcement  of  June  3 and  the  publication  of  the  Treaty  of 
London,  and  the  subsequent  actions  of  the  Italians  would  both  seem 
to  preclude  any  such  lofty  motives. 

3Scriven;  op.cit. 

Mr.  N.  J.  Cassavetes,  director  of  the  Pan-Epirotic  Union  of 
America,  an  organization  favoring  the  union  of  Northern  Epirus  with 
Greece,  replied  to  this  interview  with  a vitriolic  diatribe  against 
the  Italian  rule  in  Albania:  "Italian  occupation  assumed  the  form 
of  persecution  of  Greek  nationalism.  It  first  attacked  the  Greek 
schools,  which  were  native  institutions,  reared  and  supported 
solidly  by  native  Christian  Northern  Epirotes  . . .The  gendarmerie 
was  recruited  from  Mohammedans  and  commanded  by  leaders  of  Albanian 
bands  who  ground  down  the  Greek  peasants  and  committed  crimes  and 
outrages  without  name.”  New  York  Times, 1919,  June  24. 


‘ . - - 


•• 


59 

The  great  Allied  drive  in  the  Balkans  began  in  June  of 
1918.  By  the  middle  of  October  practically  all  of  Albania  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  Italians,  who  remained  in  possession  of  the 
country  pending  the  action  of  the  Peace  Conference.1 

In  order  to  understand  the  history  of  Albania  after  the 
armistice  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  negotiations  which 
preceded  the  entrance  of  Italy  into  the  Great  War.  In  April  of 
1915  the  representatives  of  the  Central  Powers  and  the  Italian 
government  drew  up  a treaty  which  was  to  serve  as  the  basis  for 
Italian  participation  on  the  side  of  the  Teutonic  Powers.  By  this 
agreement  Italy  was  to  secure  Valona  in  full  sovereignty,  while 
Austria  agreed  to  "cease  completely  to  take  any  interest  in 

p 

Albania."  At  the  last  minute  Austria  refused  to  accept  the  terms 
of  the  proposal  unless  their  execution  were  deferred  until  after 
the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  This  arrangement  was  not  acceptable 
to  the  Italians,  who  at  once  came  to  terms  with  the  Entente.  Two 
articles  of  the  resulting  Treaty  of  London  referred  to  Albania: 


"Art.  6:  Italy  will  secure  in  absolute  property 

Valona,  the  Island  of  Saseno,  and  as  much 
territory  as  would  be  required  to  secure 
their  military  safety  . . . 

"Art.  7:  Italy  ...  is  not,  in  the  case  of  the  creation 
of  a small  autonomous  state  in  Albania,  to 
resist  the  possible  desire  of  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Russia  to  distribute  among 
Montenegro,  Serbia,  and  Greece  the  northern 
and  southern  parts  of  Albania  . . . "3 


^Current  History,  New  York  Times,  Aug., 1919.  p,211. 

"Ibid.  Nov.  1919.  p.250. 

^Ibid.  Nov.  1919.  p.353. 

This  is  the  text  as  published  by  the  Bolshevist  government.  Its 
accuracy,  therefore,  is  not  assured,  but  inasmuch  as  the  subsequent 
action  of  the  Powers  indicates  the  use  of  similar  ideas  as  a basis 
for  action,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  terms  as  here 
given  are  substantially  correct. 


60 

By  1918  the  contents  of  the  Treaty  of  London  were  gener- 
ally known  in  Albania.  After  the  armistice  a statement  of  the 
Albanian  policy  of  Italy  was  eagerly  awaited.  The  action  of 
General  Ferrero  in  1917  was  at  first  regarded  as  a modification  of 
the  1915  agreement,  but  when  the  Italian  government  maintained  an 
ominous  silence,  the  Albanians  began  to  take  alarm.  Late  in 
December  a more  or  less  informal  gathering  of  Albanian  notables 
formed  a cabinet  at  Durazzo  despite  Italian  opposition.  In 
January  this  body  was  recognized  by  the  Italian  government.1  At 
the  Peace  Conference,  however,  Italy  declared  herself  the 
representative  of  Albanian  interests  and  refused  to  grant  pass- 
ports to  the  delegates  appointed  by  the  Albanians  themselves. 
Friction  gradually  developed  within  Albania  between  the  natives 
and  their  Italian  "protectors.”  In  April  a revolt  began  which 
dragged  on  through  the  summer.  In  December  the  Supreme  Council 
handed  down  its  dictum  on  the  Albanian  question,  providing  for  a 
frontier  rectification  to  the  south  in  favor  of  Greece,  and  an 
Italian  mandate  for  the  rest  of  the  country.  The  Jugo-Slavs  were 
to  be  allowed  commercial  rights  and  the  privilege  of  building 
railways  in  northern  Albania.  This  arrangement  not  only  met  with 
the  inevitable  objections  of  the  Albanians,  but  also  provoked  the 
determined  opposition  of  the  Serbs,  who  refused  to  tolerate  the 
continued  occupation  of  Albania  by  Italy. ^ Again,  as  in  1913, 
Albania  profited  by  the  jealousies  of  her  neighbors.  A second 

^New  York  Times,  1919.  January  25. 

"Ibid.  May  1. 

^Woods,  H.C.;  Some  Adriatic  Problems,  Contemporary  Review,  vol. 
pp. 641-42. 


. 

. 


61 


attempt  at  partition  was  made  in  January  (1920),  approximately 
following  the  lines  of  the  Treaty  of  London.  But  the  Slavs  again 


bargaining  destroyed  the  good  feeling  towards  Italy  which  had 
grown  up  in  Albania  during  the  war.  As  soon  as  the  terms  of  the 
proposed  agreement  between  Italy,  Jugo-Slavia,  and  Greece  became 
known,  the  Albanian  assembly  met  at  Lusknja  and  elected  a new 


Durazzo  being  held  by  the  Italians,  the  new  government  made 
Tirana  its  capital.  Essad  Pasha,  who  had  for  once  misjudged  the 
trajectory  which  the  proverbial  cat  was  to  make  in  jumping,  sent 
his  followers  against  Tirana,  where  they  were  decisively  defeated. 
All  other  native  opposition  then  subsided.  Aided  by  a large  force 
of  Albanians  who  had  been  trained  in  the  service  of  Italy  during 
the  Great  War,  the  Tirana  government  gradually  extended  its  control 
over  practically  all  the  interior  of  Albania.  By  June  the 
irritating  and  effective  guerrilla  warfare  carried  on  by  the 
Albanians  had  compelled  the  Italians  to  withdraw  from  the  interior 
of  the  country  to  the  coast  towns.  A series  of  carefully  planned 
uprisings  in  these  towns  was  so  successful  that  by  the  middle  of 
June  Valona  alone  remained  in  Italian  hands. ^ 

Opposition  to  Italian  rule  in  Albania  now  began  to 
appear  in  a new  quarter.  On  June  26  a battalion  of  troops  which 

^Chekrezi, C.  A.  ; Italy  and  Albania  at  Loggerheads . Current  History, 


objected  to  the  prospect  of  having  Italy  for  a neighbor.1 

The  willing  participation  of  the  Italians  in  this 


cabinet,  which- 'was  pledged  to  work  against  foreign  domination.2 


"Ibid,  p.584. 

^Chicago _ Daily  News,  1920.  July  2,  p.5. 


- ■ : ; 


' 

, ; 

. 


62 

was  embarking  at  Ancona  for  Valona  mutinied.  When  an  effort  was 
made  by  the  military  authorities  to  enforce  disciplinary  measures, 
rioting  began  which  assumed  such  serious  proportions  as  to 
precipitate  a crisis  in  the  Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The 
Socialists  took  up  the  cause  of  the  recalcitrant  soldiers  and 
began  a general  campaign  against  the  Albanian  "adventure"  which, 
they  asserted,  was  "dragging  the  country  into  fresh  slaughter.""1 
In  view  of  the  delicate  industrial  situation,  the  Giolitti  govern- 
ment was  forced  to  promise  that  no  more  troops  would  be  sent  to 
Albania  and  that  peace  would  be  made . 

A commission  was  sent  late  in  June  to  negotiate  with  the 
Tirana  government,  but  failed  to  effect  an  agreement.  A second 
effort  succeeded,  however,  and  on  August  5 a protocol  was  signed 
between  the  two  states.  By  this  agreement  Italy  gave  up  her 
claims  in  Albania  under  the  Treaty  of  London,  recognized  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  Albania,  and  surrendered  the  city  of 
Valona.  The  island  of  Saseno  at  the  mouth  of  the  Bay  of  Valona 

p 

was  retained  by  Italy  as  a naval  base. 

Now  that  the  Italian  menace  in  the  south  had  been 

removed,  the  Jugo-Slavs  began  to  encroach  on  Albanian  territory 

3 

from  the  north,  but  without  any  definite  gains.  Despite  this 
trouble  and  the  fact  that  the  government  was  technically  without  a 
head,  the  Tirana  ministry  succeeded  in  completing  the  organization 

pV.  documents  in  Contemporary  Review,  vol.  118,  pp. 276-80. 
^Chicago  Daily  News , 1920.  August  7. 

''’According  to  the  latest  reports  (April,  1921)  there  is  still 
friction  along  the  northern  frontier.  Chicago  Daily  News,  1921. 
March  30. 


. 


63 

of  Albania  into  a national  state  during  the  summer  of  1930.  In 
December  the  new  Albania  was  officially  recognized  by  admission 
into  the  League  of  Nations.1 

The  future  of  Albania  is  as  uncertain  as  its  past  is 
chaotic.  Despite  the  fact  that  membership  in  the  League  of  Nations 
is  technically  a guarantee  of  territorial  integrity,  the  northern 
and  southern  frontiers  are  still  contested  by  Serbia  and  Greece. 

The  question  of  a ruler  is  beginning  to  promise  trouble.  The 
probabilities  are  that  the  Albanians  themselves  have  not  reached 
political  maturity.  The  strength  of  character  and  tenacity  of 
purpose  of  the  Albanians,  however,  have  been  clearly  demonstrated 
by  the  heroic  and  successful  struggle  which  they  have  made  for  the 
protection  of  their  liberties  against  Turk,  Slav,  Greek,  and 
Italian  alike,  while  the  success  of  the  attempt  made  by  the  Tirana 
government  to  unite  the  whole  country  against  the  Italians,  indi- 
cates that  the  traditional  forces  working  against  union  have  been 
overcome.  If  this  spirit  of  national  unity  endures,  and  if  the 
country  is  given  an  opportunity  to  develop  naturally  and  peacefully, 
the  ultimate  prosperity  of  the  Albanian  state  seems  assured. 


nThe  committee  (on  admissions)  also  decided  against  the  admission 
of  Albania,  but  the  efforts  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  who  pointed  out 
that  the  situation  in  Albania  differed  from  that  in  Armenia  in 
that  Albania  was  not  surrounded  by  hostile  states  (.’ ) , led  the 
Assembly  to  set  aside  the  report  of  the  committee  and  Albania  was 
admitted  by  a unanimous  vote.”  Fenwick,  C.  G.;  Am.  Pol.  Sci . 

Rev. , vo 1 . 15,  p. 106. 


I ' f*  I 


* 


X 


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. 


iv 

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V 

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Newspapers 

Chicago  Daily  News. 

London  Times. 

New  York  Times. 


